Dialogues

the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety? Alcibiades True. Socrates And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage? Alcibiades True. Socrates But evil in respect of death and wounds? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates Then the rescue of one’s friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another? Alcibiades True. Socrates And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil? Alcibiades Good. Socrates And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage? Alcibiades I would rather die than be a coward. Socrates Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils? Alcibiades I do. Socrates As bad as death, I suppose? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work? Alcibiades I should. Socrates But evil because of the death which ensues? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Might we not describe their different effects as follows:⁠—You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil? Alcibiades True. Socrates Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil? Alcibiades I believe that you are right, Socrates. Socrates Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good. Alcibiades Clearly not. Socrates Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And he who acts well is happy? Alcibiades Of course. Socrates And the happy are those who obtain good? Alcibiades True. Socrates And they obtain good by acting well and honourably? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Then acting well is a good? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates And happiness is a good? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Then the good and the honourable are again identified. Alcibiades Manifestly. Socrates Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates And is the good expedient or not? Alcibiades Expedient. Socrates Do you remember our admissions about the just? Alcibiades Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably. Socrates And the honourable is the good? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And the good is expedient? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? Alcibiades I should infer so. Socrates And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer? Alcibiades I must acknowledge it to be true. Socrates And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule anyone who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil? Alcibiades I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants. Socrates And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend? Alcibiades Indeed I am not. Socrates Do you suppose that if someone were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants? Alcibiades I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should. Socrates You would feel no doubt; and for this reason⁠—because you would know? Alcibiades I suppose so. Socrates And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant? Alcibiades Very likely. Socrates And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear? Alcibiades I agree. Socrates But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge? Alcibiades Certainly he is. Socrates And do you know how to ascend into heaven? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed? Alcibiades No. Socrates Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you? Alcibiades Tell me. Socrates The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know. Alcibiades There again; what do you mean? Socrates Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food. Alcibiades Very true. Socrates And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to someone who understands the art? Alcibiades The latter. Socrates Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing? Alcibiades It would be the concern of the pilot. Socrates Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it? Alcibiades I imagine not. Socrates Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be