Dialogues

you answer the question? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who answer me? Alcibiades I am. Socrates Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? Alcibiades I am. Socrates Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker⁠—the questioner or the answerer? Alcibiades I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. Socrates And have I not been the questioner all through? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And you the answerer? Alcibiades Just so. Socrates Which of us, then, was the speaker? Alcibiades The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. Socrates Did not someone say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said? Alcibiades Very true. Socrates Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this “from yourself, and not from me”; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. Alcibiades But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good. Socrates Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient? Alcibiades Why not, Socrates?⁠—But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. Socrates What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no longer put on, but someone must produce another which is clean and new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again⁠—Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself. Alcibiades But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you. Socrates Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually. Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters. Alcibiades True. Socrates And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician? Alcibiades Quite true. Socrates And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many? Alcibiades I suppose so. Socrates And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things. Alcibiades I suppose so. Socrates Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient. Alcibiades You take liberties, Socrates. Socrates I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me. Alcibiades Proceed. Socrates Answer my questions⁠—that is all. Alcibiades Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. Socrates What, do you not wish to be persuaded? Alcibiades Certainly I do. Socrates And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? Alcibiades I think not. Socrates Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another man again. Alcibiades I won’t; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm. Socrates A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And sometimes honourable and sometimes not? Alcibiades What do you mean? Socrates I am asking if you ever knew anyone who did what was dishonourable and yet just? Alcibiades Never. Socrates All just things are honourable? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good? Alcibiades I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil. Socrates And are some dishonourable things good? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates You mean in such a case as the following:⁠—In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected