Iliad X 224. ↩
Or, according to the arrangement of Stallbaum:—
Crito: Neither of them are known to me.
Socrates: They are a new importation of Sophists, as I should imagine.
Crito: Of what country, etc.
Omitting σοφοί. ↩
Note: the ambiguity of δυνατὰ δρᾶν, “things visible and able to see,” σιγῶντα λέγειν, “the speaking of the silent,” the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare Aristotle Sophistici elenchi, c. IV. (Poste’s translation, p. 9):—
“Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:—
“I hope that you the enemy may slay.
“Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known is here affirmed to know.
“What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar sees.
“What you are holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a stone you are.
“Is a speaking of the silent possible?’ ‘The silent’ denotes either the speaker or the subject of speech.
“There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, as in ‘knowing letters.’ ‘Knowing’ and ‘letters’ are perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.”
Compare W. Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues; M. Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language; Steinthal, Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. ↩
Compare Plato, Laws, III 676:—
“Athenian Stranger: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil?
“Cleinias: What do you mean?
“Athenian Stranger: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.
“Cleinias: How so?
“Athenian Stranger: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?
“Cleinias: Hardly.
“Athenian Stranger: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and incalculable?
“Cleinias: No doubt.
“Athenian Stranger: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?”
Aristotle Metaphysics XI 8. 21:—
“And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably every art and part of wisdom had been discovered and lost many times over, such notions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our day.”
Compare again W. Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues; M. Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language; Steinthal, Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft: and for the latter part of the Essay, Delbrück, Study of Language; Paul’s Principles of the History of Language: to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely indebted. ↩
“Truth” was the title of the book of Protagoras; compare “Theaetetus” 161 E. ↩
Compare Iliad II 813, 814:—
“The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of the sportive Myrina.”
Iliad VI 402. ↩
Reading οὗ ἄν. ↩
Ἀγαμέμνων = ἀγαστὸς μένων. ↩
Hesiod, Works and Days, 120 following. ↩
Iliad XIV 201, 302:—the line is not found in the extant works of Hesiod. ↩
Compare Republic III 386, 387. ↩
Omitting πολύ. ↩
There seems to be some error in the MSS. The meaning is that the word θεονόα = θεουνόα is a curtailed form of θεοῦ νόησις, but the omitted letters do not agree. ↩
Omitting τὺ δὲ λέγειν δή ἐστιν εἴρειν. ↩
Reading ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ ε: compare infra, 437 A. ↩
Iliad VI 265. ↩
Reading θεῷ. ↩
Letters which are neither vowels nor semivowels. ↩
Cf. “Phaedrus,” 271. ↩
Vide supra, 414 C. ↩
Reading τŵ λέγειν; cf. infra, τῶ διαλέγεσθαι. ↩
Reading ταὐτά. ↩
Reading ὑπόσχες εἰπεῖν. ↩
In the original, λίγειαι, Λίγυες. ↩
Reading ἀγωγῆ. ↩
In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster–shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost. ↩
Compare “Cratylus” 388 following. ↩
Translated by Cicero Tusculanae quaestiones s. 24. ↩
The philosopher alone is not subject to judgment (κρίσις), for he has never lost the vision of truth. ↩
Or,
