Dialogues

mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object. Hermogenes You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. Socrates Why yes, the end I now dedicate to40 God, not, however, until I have explained ἀνάγκη (necessity), which ought to come next, and ἑκούσιον (the voluntary). Ἑκούσιον is certainly the yielding (εἶκον) and unresisting⁠—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion⁠—and this is the derivation of the word ἀναγκαῖον (necessary) ἀν’ ἄγκη ἰὸν, going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere with your questions. Hermogenes Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as ἀλήθεια (truth) and ψεῦδος (falsehood) and ὂν (being), not forgetting to enquire why the word ὄνομα (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has this name of ὄνομα. Socrates You know the word μαίεσθαι (to seek)? Hermogenes Yes;⁠—meaning the same as ζητεῖν (to enquire). Socrates The word ὄνομα seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying ὂν οὗ ζήτημα (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in ὀνομαστὸν (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a seeking (ὂν οὗ μάσμα); ἀλήθεια is also an agglomeration of θεία ἄλη (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence; ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (εὕδειν); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of ψ; ὂν and οὐσία are ἰὸν with an ι broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (ὂν) is also moving (ἰὸν), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise called not going (οὐκίον or οὐκὶ ὂν = οὐκ ἰόν). Hermogenes You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that someone were to say to you, what is the word ἰὸν, and what are ῥέον and δοῦν?⁠—show me their fitness. Socrates You mean to say, how should I answer him? Hermogenes Yes. Socrates One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already suggested. Hermogenes What way? Socrates To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue. Hermogenes Very likely. Socrates Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair. Hermogenes Very true. Socrates And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? The word ἀγαθὸν (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of ἀγαστὸς (admirable) and θοός (swift). And probably θοός is made up of other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further. Hermogenes I believe you to be in the right. Socrates And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined according to some new method? Hermogenes Very likely. Socrates Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary names. Hermogenes Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. Socrates I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary⁠—when they are regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. Hermogenes Certainly not. Socrates All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of things. Hermogenes Of course. Socrates And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the secondary names, is implied in their being names. Hermogenes Surely. Socrates But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary. Hermogenes That is evident. Socrates Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with