Dialogues

and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus. Socrates Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court⁠—are they not contending? Phaedrus Exactly so. Socrates About the just and unjust⁠—that is the matter in dispute? Phaedrus Yes. Socrates And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time, if he is so inclined, to be unjust? Phaedrus Exactly. Socrates And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good? Phaedrus That is true. Socrates Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking by which he makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion? Phaedrus Very true. Socrates The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art, if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others? Phaedrus How do you mean? Socrates Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception⁠—when the difference is large or small? Phaedrus When the difference is small. Socrates And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once? Phaedrus Of course. Socrates He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things? Phaedrus He must. Socrates And if he is ignorant of the true nature of any subject, how can he detect the greater or less degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant? Phaedrus He cannot. Socrates And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances? Phaedrus Yes, that is the way. Socrates Then he who would be a master of the art must understand the real nature of everything; or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it? Phaedrus He will not. Socrates He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all? Phaedrus That may be expected. Socrates Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art, according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech? Phaedrus Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and wanting in illustrations. Socrates Yes; and the two speeches happen to afford a very good example of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose, steal away the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good-fortune I attribute to the local deities; and, perhaps, the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art of my own. Phaedrus Granted; if you will only please to get on. Socrates Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias’ speech. Phaedrus “You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover. For lovers repent⁠—” Socrates Enough:⁠—Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words? Phaedrus Yes. Socrates Everyone is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ. Phaedrus I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself? Socrates When anyone speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all? Phaedrus Certainly. Socrates But when anyone speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves? Phaedrus Precisely. Socrates Then in some things we agree, but not in others? Phaedrus That is true. Socrates In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power? Phaedrus Clearly, in the uncertain class. Socrates Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err? Phaedrus He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle. Socrates Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred. Phaedrus Certainly. Socrates Now to which class does love belong⁠—to the debatable or to the undisputed class? Phaedrus To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good? Socrates Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember. Phaedrus Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake. Socrates Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover’s speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed