Dialogues

the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again: Phaedrus If you please; but you will not find what you want. Socrates Read, that I may have his exact words. Phaedrus “You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.” Socrates Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus? Phaedrus Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end. Socrates Then as to the other topics⁠—are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition? Phaedrus You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition. Socrates At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole? Phaedrus Certainly. Socrates Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connection in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian. Phaedrus What is there remarkable in the epitaph? Socrates

It is as follows:⁠—

“I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas;
So long as water flows and tall trees grow,
So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding,
I shall declare to passersby that Midas sleeps below.”

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

Phaedrus You are making fun of that oration of ours. Socrates Well, I will say no more about your friend’s speech lest I should give offence to you; although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric. Phaedrus In what way? Socrates The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike; the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted. Phaedrus And right manfully. Socrates You should rather say “madly”; and madness was the argument of them, for, as I said, “love is a madness.” Phaedrus Yes. Socrates And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention. Phaedrus True. Socrates The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain. Phaedrus I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you. Socrates Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise. Phaedrus What do you mean? Socrates I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one. Phaedrus What are they? Socrates First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear. Phaedrus What is the other principle, Socrates? Socrates The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name⁠—after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits. Phaedrus Most true. Socrates I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see “a One and Many” in nature, him I follow, and “walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.” And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God knows whether the name is right