Dialogues

know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art? Phaedrus What is our method? Socrates I cannot give you the exact details; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as is in my power, how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art. Phaedrus Let me hear. Socrates Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls⁠—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes:⁠—“Such and such persons,” he will say, “are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way,” and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, “This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion”;⁠—he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned;⁠—when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says “I don’t believe you” has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another? Phaedrus He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another, and yet the creation of such an art is not easy. Socrates Very true; and therefore let us consider this matter in every light, and see whether we cannot find a shorter and easier road; there is no use in taking a long rough roundabout way if there be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try and remember whether you have heard from Lysias or anyone else anything which might be of service to us. Phaedrus If trying would avail, then I might; but at the moment I can think of nothing. Socrates Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me. Phaedrus Certainly. Socrates May not “the wolf,” as the proverb says, “claim a hearing”? Phaedrus Do you say what can be said for him. Socrates He will argue that there is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round, until you arrive at first principles; for, as I said at first, when the question is of justice and good, or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has no need of truth⁠—for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction: and this is based on probability, to which he who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts, if they are improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defence, and that always in speaking, the orator should keep probability in view, and say goodbye to the truth. And the observance of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art. Phaedrus That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say, Socrates. I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon this matter59 already; with them the point is all-important. Socrates I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he not define probability to be that which the many think? Phaedrus Certainly, he does. Socrates I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort:⁠—He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should argue thus: “How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him?” The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right, Phaedrus? Phaedrus Certainly. Socrates Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not? Phaedrus What shall we say to him? Socrates Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else