Dialogues

they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, “What is virtue?” would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand? Meno I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. Socrates When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? Meno I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. Socrates And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference? Meno I think not. Socrates And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? Meno I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others. Socrates But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? Meno I did say so. Socrates And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? Meno Certainly not. Socrates Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice? Meno Certainly. Socrates Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? Meno True. Socrates And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust? Meno They cannot. Socrates They must be temperate and just? Meno Yes. Socrates Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues? Meno Such is the inference. Socrates And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same? Meno They would not. Socrates Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. Meno Will you have one definition of them all? Socrates That is what I am seeking. Meno If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind. Socrates And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave? Meno I think not, Socrates. Socrates No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is “the power of governing”; but do you not add “justly and not unjustly”? Meno Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue. Socrates Would you say “virtue,” Meno, or “a virtue”? Meno What do you mean? Socrates I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is “a figure” and not simply “figure,” and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures. Meno Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue⁠—that there are other virtues as well as justice. Socrates What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me. Meno Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and there are many others. Socrates Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all. Meno Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. Socrates No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that someone asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered “roundness,” he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is “figure” or “a figure”; and you would answer “a figure.” Meno Certainly. Socrates And for this reason⁠—that there are other figures? Meno Yes. Socrates And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him. Meno I should. Socrates And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well. Meno I should. Socrates And if he had said, Tell me what they are?⁠—you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness. Meno Yes. Socrates And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure⁠—which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other⁠—that would be your mode of speaking? Meno Yes. Socrates And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round? Meno Certainly not. Socrates You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than