Dialogues

the straight, or the straight than the round? Meno Very true. Socrates To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the “simile in multis”? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that “simile in multis” which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue. Meno I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. Socrates Shall I indulge you? Meno By all means. Socrates And then you will tell me about virtue? Meno I will. Socrates Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. Meno Certainly. Socrates Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer?⁠—Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue? Meno But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. Socrates Why simple? Meno Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour. Socrates (Granted.) Meno But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is⁠—what sort of answer would you have given him? Socrates I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician’s vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity?⁠—all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated⁠—that is all which I am saying⁠—not anything very difficult. Meno Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning. Socrates And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry. Meno Yes. Socrates Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid. Meno And now, Socrates, what is colour? Socrates You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias’ definition of virtue. Meno When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates. Socrates A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. Meno Why do you think so? Socrates Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer. Meno Please do. Socrates Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you? Meno I should like nothing better. Socrates Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence? Meno Certainly. Socrates And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? Meno Exactly. Socrates And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large? Meno True. Socrates And there is such a thing as sight? Meno Yes. Socrates And now, as Pindar says, “read my meaning”:⁠—colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. Meno That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer. Socrates Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena. Meno Quite true. Socrates The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure. Meno Yes. Socrates And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries. Meno But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. Socrates Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern. Meno

Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide