Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:persona">Euthyphro Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them. Socrates Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words. Euthyphro Of course. Socrates Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said? Euthyphro It was. Socrates And well said? Euthyphro Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said. Socrates And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences? Euthyphro Yes, that was also said. Socrates And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? Euthyphro True. Socrates Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring? Euthyphro Very true. Socrates And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine? Euthyphro To be sure. Socrates But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?98 Euthyphro Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe. Socrates And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature? Euthyphro Certainly they are. Socrates They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences⁠—would there now? Euthyphro You are quite right. Socrates Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them? Euthyphro Very true. Socrates But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust⁠—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them. Euthyphro Very true. Socrates Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them? Euthyphro True. Socrates And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious? Euthyphro So I should suppose. Socrates Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Herè, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion. Euthyphro But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that. Socrates Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear anyone arguing that a murderer or any sort of evildoer ought to be let off? Euthyphro I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence. Socrates But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? Euthyphro No; they do not. Socrates Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not? Euthyphro Yes. Socrates Then they do not argue that the evildoer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evildoer is, and what he did and when? Euthyphro True. Socrates And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? Euthyphro That is true, Socrates, in the main. Socrates But they join issue about the particulars⁠—gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true? Euthyphro Quite true. Socrates Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of