Dialogues

his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live. Euthyphro It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you. Socrates I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods. Euthyphro Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me. Socrates But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: “Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.” And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? Euthyphro Why not, Socrates? Socrates Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider. Euthyphro Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious. Socrates Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say? Euthyphro We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry. Socrates We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. Euthyphro I do not understand your meaning, Socrates. Socrates I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? Euthyphro I think that I understand. Socrates And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? Euthyphro Certainly. Socrates Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? Euthyphro No; that is the reason. Socrates And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen? Euthyphro True. Socrates And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree? Euthyphro Yes. Socrates Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? Euthyphro Yes. Socrates And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state. Euthyphro Certainly. Socrates And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? Euthyphro Yes. Socrates Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? Euthyphro No, that is the reason. Socrates It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved? Euthyphro Yes. Socrates And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them? Euthyphro Certainly. Socrates Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things. Euthyphro How do you mean, Socrates? Socrates I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved. Euthyphro Yes. Socrates But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them. Euthyphro True. Socrates But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (θεοφιλὲς) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (ὅσιον) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I