Dialogues

let us obtain, not through any third person, but from his own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement. Theodorus In what way? Socrates In this way:⁠—His words are, “What seems to a man, is to him.” Theodorus Yes, so he says. Socrates And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that everyone thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? In the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion. Theodorus Certainly. Socrates And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion. Theodorus Exactly. Socrates How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that you yourself, or any other follower of Protagoras, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion? Theodorus The thing is incredible, Socrates. Socrates And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things. Theodorus How so? Socrates Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that this is true to you. Now, if so, you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you and are of an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely? Theodorus Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble. Socrates Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others? Theodorus No other inference seems to be possible. Socrates And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of all things, must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true. Theodorus That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion. Socrates And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men are true. Theodorus Certainly. Socrates And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true? Theodorus Of course. Socrates Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely? Theodorus They do not. Socrates And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true. Theodorus Clearly. Socrates Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion⁠—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned⁠—am I not right? Theodorus Yes. Socrates And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to anyone else? Theodorus I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard. Socrates But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to me, and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as they are, and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing which no one will deny is, that there are great differences in the understandings of men. Theodorus In that opinion I quite agree. Socrates And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that most things, and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are only such as they appear; if however difference of opinion is to be allowed at all, surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? for every woman, child, or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves. Theodorus I quite agree. Socrates Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the