Dialogues

and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever; for men glory in their shame⁠—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, “These are not mere good-for-nothing persons, mere burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.” Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know⁠—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evildoers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped. Theodorus What is that? Socrates There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: but they do not see them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends⁠—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots. Theodorus Very true, Socrates. Socrates Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return. Theodorus For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument. Socrates Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were really good;⁠—he who said so would be playing with the name “good,” and would not touch the real question⁠—it would be a mockery, would it not? Theodorus Certainly it would. Socrates He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is contemplated under the name. Theodorus Right. Socrates Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim? Theodorus Certainly not. Socrates But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen? Theodorus Yes, I think that there are mistakes. Socrates The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognised, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time; which, in other words, is the future. Theodorus Very true. Socrates Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question:⁠—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things⁠—white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so? Theodorus Yes. Socrates And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further say), to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:⁠—When an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?⁠—he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician’s judgment? Theodorus How ludicrous! Socrates And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player? Theodorus Certainly. Socrates And in musical composition the musician will know better than the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think harmonious or the reverse? Theodorus Of course. Socrates And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing; but can we say that everyone will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future?⁠—nay, would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince anyone