Dialogues

word that will suit them, except perhaps “no how,” which is perfectly indefinite. Theodorus Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home. Socrates And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things⁠—a wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is. Theodorus Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering; for this was the agreement. Theaetetus Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing. Theodorus You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument. Theaetetus Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest. Theodorus Invite Socrates to an argument⁠—invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer. Socrates Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus. Theodorus Not comply! for what reason? Socrates My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that “All is one and at rest,” as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;⁠—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his words, and may be still further from understanding his meaning; above all I fear that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, if we let them in⁠—besides, the question which is now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge. Theaetetus Very well; do so if you will. Socrates Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception? Theaetetus I did. Socrates And if anyone were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear high and low sounds?⁠—you would say, if I am not mistaken, “With the eyes and with the ears.” Theaetetus I should. Socrates The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears. Theaetetus I should say “through,” Socrates, rather than “with.” Socrates Yes, my boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a sort of Trojan horse, there are perched a number of unconnected senses, which do not all meet in some one nature, the mind, or whatever we please to call it, of which they are the instruments, and with which through them we perceive objects of sense. Theaetetus I agree with you in that opinion. Socrates The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether, when we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again, other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves, and, if you were asked, you might refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body? Theaetetus Of the body, certainly. Socrates And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing? Theaetetus Of course not. Socrates If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ? Theaetetus It cannot. Socrates How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself? Theaetetus Certainly. Socrates And that both are two and each of them one? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another? Theaetetus I dare say. Socrates But through what do you perceive all this about them? for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration of the point at issue:⁠—If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and colours are saline or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other. Theaetetus Certainly; the faculty of taste. Socrates Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we were just asking⁠—what organs will you assign