Dialogues

was no care of men in the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an art than any king. Young Socrates True. Stranger But no other art or science will have a prior or better right than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in general. Young Socrates Quite true. Stranger In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great error was committed at the end of our analysis. Young Socrates What was it? Stranger Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be said. Young Socrates Certainly not. Stranger Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions. Young Socrates How can they be made? Stranger First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or manager. Young Socrates True. Stranger And the art of management which is assigned to man would again have to be subdivided. Young Socrates On what principle? Stranger On the principle of voluntary and compulsory. Young Socrates Why? Stranger Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are utterly distinct, like their modes of government. Young Socrates True. Stranger Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory. Young Socrates Certainly. Stranger And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman? Young Socrates I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of the Statesman. Stranger Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art. Young Socrates Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains? I wish that you would tell me. Stranger The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know nothing. Young Socrates What do you mean? Stranger I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about our experience of knowledge. Young Socrates Why so? Stranger Why, because my “example” requires the assistance of another example. Young Socrates Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire. Stranger I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: when children are beginning to know their letters⁠— Young Socrates What are you going to say? Stranger That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly. Young Socrates Certainly. Stranger Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think and speak falsely of them. Young Socrates Very true. Stranger Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know be⁠— Young Socrates Be what? Stranger To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the letters are the same, and have the same character in both combinations, until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and not another, and is always called by the same name. Young Socrates Certainly. Stranger Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true notion, which includes both of them. Young Socrates Exactly. Stranger Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them? Young Socrates There is nothing wonderful in that. Stranger Could anyone, my friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom? Young Socrates Hardly. Stranger Then you