Dialogues

I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. Socrates Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and those engaged358 in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent? Protarchus True. Socrates He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which are becoming, or which will or have become. Protarchus Very true. Socrates And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth ever become certain? Protarchus Impossible. Socrates How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness? Protarchus How indeed? Socrates Then mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth? Protarchus I should imagine not. Socrates And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. Protarchus What point? Socrates Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class. Protarchus Very true. Socrates And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things? Protarchus That is natural. Socrates And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure? Protarchus Very true, Socrates. Socrates In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands. Protarchus Yes. Socrates And now we must begin to mix them? Protarchus By all means. Socrates But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories? Protarchus Of what? Socrates Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good. Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument. Protarchus Let me hear. Socrates Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names “good” and “pleasant” are correctly given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us? Protarchus What was it? Socrates That the good differs from all other things. Protarchus In what respect? Socrates In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else. Protarchus Exactly. Socrates And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure? Protarchus We did. Socrates And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient? Protarchus Certainly not. Socrates And if we erred in any point, then let anyone who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire⁠—I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling⁠—but would he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that anyone would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of wisdom? Protarchus Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any more? Socrates Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of them? Protarchus Impossible. Socrates Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned. Protarchus Right. Socrates Have we not found a road which leads towards the good? Protarchus What road? Socrates Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed. Protarchus True. Socrates There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not? Protarchus Far greater. Socrates Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mingling. Protarchus By all means. Socrates Are not we the cupbearers? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a