Dialogues

of his neighbours at which he is pleased? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil? Protarchus To be sure. Socrates From these considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous. Protarchus Explain. Socrates The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi. Protarchus You mean, Socrates, “Know thyself.” Socrates I do; and the opposite would be, “Know not thyself.” Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three. Protarchus Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. Socrates Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you? Protarchus Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will. Socrates Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown? Protarchus What are they? Socrates In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is. Protarchus Yes, that is a very common error. Socrates And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not. Protarchus Of course. Socrates And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. Protarchus Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. Socrates And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And may not all this be truly called an evil condition? Protarchus Very evil. Socrates But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain. Protarchus How can we make the further division which you suggest? Socrates All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes⁠—one having power and might; and the other the reverse. Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous. Protarchus That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains. Socrates Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. Protarchus Proceed. Socrates Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain? Protarchus Most true. Socrates There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies? Protarchus Certainly not. Socrates But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends’ misfortunes⁠—is not that wrong? Protarchus Undoubtedly. Socrates Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? Protarchus True. Socrates And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated⁠—the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? Protarchus They are ridiculous. Socrates And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? Protarchus Clearly we feel pleasure. Socrates And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant. Protarchus True. Socrates And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases. Protarchus I do not see how anyone can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. Socrates I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named; did I not? Protarchus Yes. Socrates We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger. Protarchus I see. Socrates Then many other cases still remain? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;⁠—if I promise that tomorrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands. Protarchus Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course. Socrates Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order. Protarchus Excellent. Socrates These, in turn, then,