Dialogues

anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist. Protarchus Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable. Socrates And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false? Protarchus Quite so. Socrates And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false? Protarchus In no other way. Socrates Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false. Protarchus Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable. Socrates Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision. Protarchus Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures. Socrates I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. Protarchus Very good. Socrates Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument. Protarchus Proceed. Socrates We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul⁠—do you remember? Protarchus Yes, I remember that you said so. Socrates And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced. Protarchus True. Socrates Then now you may infer what happens in such cases. Protarchus What am I to infer? Socrates That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown. Protarchus Clearly. Socrates And there is another point to which we have agreed. Protarchus What is it? Socrates That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites. Protarchus Certainly, we said so. Socrates But how can we rightly judge of them? Protarchus How can we? Socrates Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure? Protarchus Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly. Socrates Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains? Protarchus Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. Socrates Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before. Protarchus What was that? Socrates Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity. Protarchus Very true. Socrates But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures. Protarchus Certainly, and for the reason which you mention. Socrates And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true. Protarchus Certainly not. Socrates Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these. Protarchus What are they, and how shall we find them? Socrates If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay? Protarchus Yes, that has been often said. Socrates And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure? Protarchus Right. Socrates But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes. Protarchus When can that be, Socrates? Socrates Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument. Protarchus Why not, Socrates? Socrates Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine. Protarchus And what was that? Socrates Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were? Protarchus You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad? Socrates Yes. Protarchus Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain. Socrates Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down. Protarchus Yes, and their words are of no mean authority. Socrates Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight. Protarchus How? Socrates To them we will say: “Good; but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us⁠—for example, of our growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?” You must answer for them. Protarchus The latter alternative is the true one. Socrates Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains? Protarchus True. Socrates A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be⁠— Protarchus What? Socrates If we say that the great changes produce