Dialogues

we were saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false. Socrates How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure! Protarchus Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear. Socrates And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance? Protarchus There must be a very great difference, between them. Socrates Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. Protarchus Lead, and I will follow. Socrates Well, then, my view is⁠— Protarchus What is it? Socrates We agree⁠—do we not?⁠—that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these⁠—upon true and false opinion, I mean. Protarchus Very true. Socrates And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature? Protarchus Of what nature? Socrates An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees. Protarchus Very likely. Socrates Soon he begins to interrogate himself. Protarchus In what manner? Socrates He asks himself⁠—“What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree?” This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance. Protarchus True. Socrates To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a whisper to himself⁠—“It is a man.” Protarchus Very good. Socrates Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say⁠—“No, it is a figure made by the shepherds.” Protarchus Yes. Socrates And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition. Protarchus Certainly. Socrates But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time. Protarchus Very true. Socrates Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of this phenomenon. Protarchus What is your explanation? Socrates I think that the soul at such times is like a book. Protarchus How so? Socrates Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls⁠—but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. Protarchus I quite assent and agree to your statement. Socrates I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul. Protarchus Who is he? Socrates The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things which he has described. Protarchus But when and how does he do this? Socrates When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them;⁠—is not this a very common mental phenomenon? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false; are they not? Protarchus They are. Socrates If we are right so far, there arises a further question. Protarchus What is it? Socrates Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also? Protarchus I should say in relation to all times alike. Socrates Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future? Protarchus Most true. Socrates And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the future? Protarchus To the future, very much. Socrates When you say, “Very much,” you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence? Protarchus Exactly. Socrates Answer me another question. Protarchus What question? Socrates A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not? Protarchus Certainly he is. Socrates And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse? Protarchus True. Socrates And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune. Protarchus True. Socrates And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures. Protarchus They are. Socrates The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures? Protarchus Doubtless. Socrates Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character? Protarchus There are. Socrates And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future? Protarchus Quite true. Socrates And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character? Protarchus How do you mean? Socrates I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or