Dialogues

having too all the attributes of wisdom;⁠—we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the selfsame elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things? Protarchus Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. Socrates Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? Protarchus Most justly. Socrates And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? Protarchus Certainly not. Socrates And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to be called. Protarchus Very true. Socrates Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe. Protarchus True. Socrates And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of all; and I think that you now have my answer. Protarchus I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered. Socrates A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts earnest. Protarchus Very true. Socrates I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. Protarchus True. Socrates And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own. Protarchus I shall be sure to remember. Socrates We must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain. Protarchus If this is the road, let us take it. Socrates I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain. Protarchus What do you mean? Socrates I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class. Protarchus And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one? Socrates I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability. Protarchus Very good. Socrates Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four. Protarchus That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony. Socrates Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention? Protarchus Proceed; I am attending. Socrates I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. Protarchus That is very probable. Socrates And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment. Protarchus I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer? Socrates Do not obvious and everyday phenomena furnish the simplest illustration? Protarchus What phenomena do you mean? Socrates Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain. Protarchus True. Socrates Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure? Protarchus Yes. Socrates Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. Protarchus Very true. Socrates And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure? Protarchus Granted; what you say has a general truth. Socrates Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described? Protarchus Good. Socrates Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. Protarchus Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation. Socrates Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good. Protarchus You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue. Socrates Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be