Dialogues

the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small? Protarchus Certainly not. Socrates Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain? Protarchus Very true. Socrates And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say a few words about it. Protarchus What have you to say? Socrates Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state. Protarchus You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing? Socrates Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom. Protarchus Yes, certainly, we said so. Socrates Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives? Protarchus If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow. Socrates Certainly not⁠—there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first. Protarchus Just so. Socrates The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory. Protarchus What do you mean? Socrates I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up. Protarchus How will you proceed? Socrates Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both and to each of them. Protarchus Granted. Socrates And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second? Protarchus Quite true. Socrates When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see? Protarchus Yes. Socrates Then just be so good as to change the terms. Protarchus How shall I change them? Socrates Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness. Protarchus I see. Socrates And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness? Protarchus Most true. Socrates Then now we know the meaning of the word? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness? Protarchus Right. Socrates But do we not distinguish memory from recollection? Protarchus I think so. Socrates And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence? Protarchus Very true. Socrates There is a reason why I say all this. Protarchus What is it? Socrates I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the previous analysis helps to show the nature of both. Protarchus Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point. Socrates There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire. Protarchus Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing. Socrates Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer. Protarchus A fair retort; but let us proceed. Socrates Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name? Protarchus By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily answered; but it must be answered. Socrates Then let us go back to our examples. Protarchus Where shall we begin? Socrates Do we mean anything when we say “a man thirsts”? Protarchus Yes. Socrates We mean to say that he “is empty”? Protarchus Of course. Socrates And is not thirst desire? Protarchus Yes, of drink. Socrates Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? Protarchus I should say, of replenishment with drink. Socrates Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full? Protarchus Clearly so. Socrates But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past experience? Protarchus Impossible. Socrates And yet he who desires, surely desires something? Protarchus Of course. Socrates He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment? Protarchus True. Socrates Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment? Protarchus There must. Socrates And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied? Protarchus Yes. Socrates The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can there be? Protarchus I cannot imagine any other. Socrates But do you see the consequence? Protarchus What is it? Socrates That