Dialogues

there is no such thing as desire of the body. Protarchus Why so? Socrates Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. Protarchus Yes. Socrates And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. Protarchus True. Socrates And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. Protarchus Most true. Socrates The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience. Protarchus Quite right. Socrates Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections. Protarchus Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking? Socrates I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it. Protarchus True. Socrates And what would you say of the intermediate state? Protarchus What do you mean by “intermediate”? Socrates I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased? Protarchus Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation. Socrates What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair? Protarchus Very true. Socrates And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain? Protarchus I suppose so. Socrates But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single case possible. Protarchus Quite true, Socrates. Socrates Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question? Protarchus What question? Socrates Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false? Protarchus But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? Socrates And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions? Protarchus I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures. Socrates What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry. Protarchus There I agree. Socrates And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus’ boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument. Protarchus Surely. Socrates No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent. Protarchus Right. Socrates I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised. Protarchus How so? Socrates Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true? Protarchus To be sure I do. Socrates Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic? Protarchus So we have always held, Socrates. Socrates But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion? Protarchus I think that we should. Socrates Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And such a thing as pleasure? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And an opinion must be of something? Protarchus True. Socrates And a man must be pleased by something? Protarchus Quite correct. Socrates And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure? Protarchus Yes; that is also quite true. Socrates Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? Protarchus Yes; that is the question. Socrates You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality? Protarchus Clearly. Socrates But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. Protarchus Quite true. Socrates And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? Protarchus Quite true, Socrates. Socrates And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? Protarchus Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? Socrates And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false? Protarchus Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as