Dialogues

sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.”⁠—Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion? Protarchus Most certainly. Socrates And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture. Protarchus What is that? Socrates Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist. Protarchus Impossible. Socrates Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body. Protarchus I agree with you, Socrates. Socrates And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good? Protarchus I think that we are. Socrates What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind. Protarchus Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge. Socrates And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all. Protarchus What do you mean? Socrates Every man knows it. Protarchus What? Socrates He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which brings confusion on the possessor of it. Protarchus Most true. Socrates And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over. Protarchus True. Socrates Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture. Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them. Protarchus Quite right. Socrates And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and men. Protarchus Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end. Socrates We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin. Protarchus You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure? Socrates Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself⁠—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. Protarchus There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest. Socrates Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? Protarchus Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge. Socrates Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two? Protarchus No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, present, or future. Socrates Right. Protarchus But when we see someone indulging in pleasures, perhaps in the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day. Socrates Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature has been found. Protarchus Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. Socrates In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. Protarchus True. Socrates And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright. Protarchus I dare say. Socrates And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul⁠—sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is. Protarchus Surely. Socrates The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses.360 Protarchus Perhaps. Socrates

And now, as Orpheus says,

“With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.”

Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse.

Protarchus True. Socrates Then let us sum up and reassert what has been