376–389.
3 Aleksander Savelyev and Nikolay Detinov,
4 “Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” May 31, 1983,
5 “The Problem of Discovering Preparation for a Nuclear Missile Attack on the USSR,” reproduced in Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky,
6 Gordievsky, interview, Aug. 29, 2005.
7 Markus Wolf,
8 Volkogonov, p. 361.
9 Yevgeny Chazov,
10 “The History of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in 1982,” from Commanding officer, USS Enterprise, R. J. Kelly, to Chief of Naval Operations, March 28, 1983.
11 Pete Earley,
12 John F. Lehman Jr.,
13 Confidential source.
14 “The History of USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in 1983,” Memorandum from J. J. Dantone to Chief of Naval Operations, April 23, 1984, and “Command History for Calendar Year 1983,” Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 113, T. A. Chiprany, to Chief of Naval Operations, March 1, 1984. Watkins testimony is from Seymour M. Hersh,
15 Hersh, pp. 25–26.
16 Andrei Illesh, “Secret of the Korean Boeing 747,”
17 Whitworth had received $60,000 from Walker just before he sailed on the
18 Howard Blum,
19 Affidavit of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, director of naval intelligence, in
20 Affidavit of Studeman in
21 Christopher Andrew,
22 Don Oberdorfer,
23 United Press International, Aug. 30, 1983, “Presidential Fence Is Finished.”
24 Politburo minutes, Aug. 4, 1983. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Volkogonov Collection, Reel 17, Container 25, on file at the National Security Archive, READD Record 9965.
25 Andrew and Gordievsky,
26 Gordievsky, interview, Aug. 29, 2005.
CHAPTER 3: WAR SCARE
1 This account is based on reports by the International Civil Aviation Organization, Dec. 2, 1983, and May 28, 1993, and on the Osipovich interview by Illesh.
2 The 1993 report of the ICAO stated: “The proximity of the RC-135 and KE 007 resulted in 1983 in confusion and the plotting of the track of only one aircraft.” Pp. 47–48.
3 Seymour M. Hersh,
4 The plane rocking is mentioned in Osipovich interview, August 1997, for
5 Osipovich,
6 Nancy Reagan with William Novak,
7 Hersh, Ch. 8.
8 Cable “To All Diplomatic Posts,” Sept. 5, 1983, carrying “text of the background statement delivered by Under Secretary [Lawrence] Eagleburger September 5 concerning the flight of the US RC-135.” RRPL.
9 Douglas MacEachin, interview, July 25, 2005.
10 On Dec. 29, 1987, the State Department released an intelligence assessment showing the United States knew after the shoot down that it was due to Soviet ineptitude. Representative Lee Hamilton released the declassified assessment January 12, 1988. J. Edward Fox, assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, said, “We had concluded by the second day (Sept. 2, 1983) that the Soviets thought they were pursuing a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft throughout most, if not all, of the overflight.”
11 Robert M. Gates,
12 Dmitri Volkogonov,
13 Anatoly Dobrynin,
14 TASS, Sept. 1, 1983, 17:17 in English, “Soviet Air Space Violated,” FBIS, USSR International Affairs, Northeast Asia, Sept. 1, 1983, p. C2.
15 Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, Sept. 2, 1983, courtesy Svetlana Savranskaya, TNSA.
16 Volkogonov, pp. 365–366.
17 “Provocateurs Cover Traces,” TASS report in
18 On Sept. 5, Reagan signed NSDD 102, which punished Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline, and caused it to close offices in Washington and New York; seeking to force the Soviets to accept responsibility through public