which adds a force of B-1B bombers from the 34th BS at Ellsworth AFB. You also may have noticed the force of support aircraft that is added to each package option. These are the E-3s, EF-111s, and EC-130s, which would accompany the wing on any deployment.
It would probably be impossible to deploy the entire wing (a C+ Package) in one wave, due to the shortage of heavy airlift. Thus, for anything larger than an A Package, the wing is broken into separate waves, so that tanker and heavy transport aircraft can be utilized in shifts. For example, the deployment breakdown for a B Package would look like this:
The C+ Package, which is the largest option available, looks like this:
Each wave would be separated by something like twenty-four to thirty-six hours, and would depend on tanker and airlift support to get certain key pieces of equipment and personnel onto the ground at the right time and in the right order. The matter of airlift cannot be overemphasized these days, since the force of AMC heavy airlift aircraft (C-141s, C-5s, and C-17s) is at the danger level when it comes to moving important stuff for top-priority units like the 366th. The AMC heavy airlift force in early 1995 consisted of the following aircraft:
As you can see, the heavy airlift fleet is limited to less than 375 PAA aircraft assigned to units around the USAF. This situation is going to get worse as C-141s are retired faster than new C-17s are delivered. Whenever possible, AMC will try to use commercial freight aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a pool of commercial freight aircraft subsidized by the U.S. Government and available to be drafted in a time of crisis. Another option for AMC is to charter freight aircraft from air carriers like UPS, Emery Air Freight, Federal Express, or even some of the huge Antonov 124 transports operated by the Russian flag carrier, Aeroflot.
As for the 366th Wing, they have worked hard to reduce their heavy airlift requirements to the bare minimum to get into operation at a host base in the minimum amount of time. The key is the number of C-141 loads it will take to get a particular package into action at the destination. Because the C-5 and C-17 can carry bigger loads of cargo (including outsized loads), and the KC-10 is limited to palletized cargo and personnel only, the load planners at the 366th Transport Squadron transportation office have to take this into account when they get the phone calls from AMC headquarters at Scott AFB. They plan for all kinds of possibilities. For example, consider the following notional table of airlift required to move various package combinations:
It should be noted that the above table is representative of only one particular planning scenario (the most optimistic actually), and should not be considered definitive. In fact, for bare-base operations, you should probably double the number of C-141 loads and throw in the services of one of the USAF Red Horse battalions.
Now, let's look back to our earlier example of an A Package going to a well-developed host base. As you can see, about thirty C-141s, along with appropriate tanker assets, would be needed to move the force overseas to the host operating base, and once the wing is in the air, the clock and the meter are running with regards to pushing cargo and supplies forward. What you see in the above table is just the down payment on a credible 366th deployment. A continuing logistics effort is vital to keeping the wing flying and operating up to its full potential, because on the ground the 366th is only a set of targets for another air force to destroy.
Hold Until Relieved: The 366th Style of Operations
Let's assume that General McCloud and the 366th Wing leadership has gotten the designated wing package to their host base. What happens next? Actually, well before the first combat aircraft has arrived, there will be a great deal of activity at the base, starting with the arrival of the FAST-1 tanker with its site survey team. Working quickly, they will size up the base, and using their own SATCOM link, will send back to Mountain Home the exact support requirements for the wing, so that the proper AMC airlift can be ordered and the right pallets and cargo can be loaded and sent on their way. Right after this comes FAST-2 with the AOC buildup team to establish the WICP satellite communications links back to Mountain Home and the Space Warfighting Center in Colorado Springs. Following this would be the CI element with their CTAPS equipment on FAST-3. This would be immediately moved to the AOC to keep the planning process going. Finally, FAST-4 would arrive, hopefully together with the first elements of the wing package with the aircrews and maintenance personnel necessary to fly the 366th's first missions.
So, just what might those missions be?
The Gunfighters are capable of almost any combat operation, except launching long-range cruise missiles or doing a stealth penetration strike of an enemy air defense environment. Below is a chart of the different mission capabilities of the various aircraft of the 366th Wing (and attached units):
As can be seen, the Gunfighters provide a core capability to run rapid response air operations in a crisis initiated by a hostile government or force. The 366th is an aerial fire brigade, grudgingly willing to trade losses to buy time for the politicians back home to make up their minds, define a policy, and send forward reinforcement and/or replacement units. It is assumed that these would take over for the long-term campaign that would follow the commitment of a unit like the 366th. It is likely that the deployment of a package by the Gunfighters would be part of a joint operation with ground units from the Marine Corps or the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps. Just how they would fight in a crisis is therefore rather hard to specify, given the unpredictability of rogue states and other 'bad guys' around the world. Thus, the 366th leadership will have to be both sneaky and imaginative in their use of their limited force of planes and aircrews.
The temptation to engage in an aerial form of guerrilla warfare must be balanced by the principles of mass and coordination that were proven during operations like Desert Storm and Just Cause. This means massing airpower assets, not just parceling them out wastefully and dangerously in penny packets. It also means looking for unconventional ways of hurting an opponent, so that they can be caught looking somewhere else while the wing hits the 'real' target. The Gunfighters Operations Staff must look for centers of gravity to hit, rather than punching away at an enemy's strength. The key to doing this is keeping their fighting edge sharp, and that means training and exercising. We'll take a look at the wing doing this in the next chapter, when we deploy with them to the biggest exercise they attend each year, Operation Green Flag at Nellis AFB, Nevada.
Getting Ready for War: Green Flag 94-3
An air force is more than an expensive collection of planes and personnel. A nation cannot just throw money and youth into building an aerial fighting force and expect to get anything more than a glorified flying club for military pageants. While an air force cannot win a war all by itself (despite what some zealots would like you to believe), since World War I
Yes, air forces are hideously expensive. Figure on spending about $20 million for each modern single seat fighter, $2 million to select and train each pilot to a combat-ready level, and perhaps $100 million per wing per year,
