THE ECM GAP
Electronics are here to stay: They have become at least as important as airframes. Electronic warfare (EW) goes hand in glove with electronic countermeasures (ECM), with an aviation heritage dating to the Second World War. Jamming hostile radars and communications has become even more important since Vietnam, as it not only helps prevent friendly losses but contributes to achieving the specific mission.
However, the U.S. Air Force got out of the ECM business after Desert Storm in 1991. With retirement of the EF-111 Raven, the blue suits were forced to rely on the Navy and Marine Corps to save their electronic bacon. EA- 6Bs, or 'Purple Prowlers,' were integrated into operational plans (purple being the mixture of two shades of blue with Marine green).
It goes even beyond that. Air Force pilots and WSOs are flying Navy Prowlers today. But it does not solve the Air Force's long-term ECM problem.
The good news: Purple works. As usual, the operators sort things out and work together if for no other reason than their mission (and perhaps their existence) requires it. However, since the Navy and Marines decided to replace the long-serving Prowler with the EF-18G, the Air Force anticipates problems. The 'Electric Hornet' lacks some of the Prowler's versatility, but at least it's a dedicated EW platform capable of operating with the strikers. However, some Air Force careerists are nervous about swabbies and jarheads becoming involved in USAF expeditionary wings. It looks bad, they admit behind closed doors, to remind budgeteers and congressmen that the USAF must rely on Brand X and Y for a crucial combat role: jamming enemy radars and radios.
The Air Force conducted a Prowler replacement study in 2002 and concluded that buying its own EF-18s was not an option. Certainly there was no historic reason for the decision, since the Air Force readily adopted the F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair II, both of which enjoyed long non-carrier careers. But, whatever its reason for passing on the Hornet, the Air Force decided to build new pods for the B-52H which will assume a stand-off jamming mission among its other tasks. The Air Force also intends to launch a hurry-up program for electronic warfare UAVs (Unmanned Air Vehicles) equipped with jammers, affording an 'overhead' ECM capability to enhance the B-52. There have been references to a couple of 'black' programs that may or may not work out, but in either case they will involve considerable expense.
We can expect the 366th Wing of the future to include both standoff and overhead jammers, with increasing reliance on UAVs. While some things may indeed last forever, not even B-52s fit that category!
The Air Force's current tactical aircraft have job security for the near term, and even beyond. Some 700 A- 10s were delivered from 1976 to 1984, and though the latest Warthogs are nearly twenty years old, upgrades are planned on remaining aircraft beginning in 2004. The big, ungainly looking Thunderbolt remained beloved of infantrymen in both Iraq wars, and A-10 pilots insist there's nothing comparable on the horizon: not even the Joint Strike Fighter affords as much bang for the buck. Consequently, Warthogs could still be flying in 2028.
The F-15C/D is expected to retire in 2030, and though the air superiority Eagle has met only sporadic opposition since 1991, it's still the world standard. Meanwhile, the F-15E remains in low-rate production (as few as three per year), but the newest 'mud eagles' are rated at 16,000 service hours: double the lifetime of earlier F-15s. Their dual-purpose mission ensures that they will be occupied well into the future.
Meanwhile, the F-16, still in production, remains a growth industry, especially for the export market. Even Poland is expected to obtain several dozen Falcons under generous terms.
FUTURE WARS
The past quarter century has tossed up some oddball wars: Britain versus Argentina; America versus Iraq (twice); and America versus Afghanistan, of all places. Even including the Balkan mini-wars of the 1990s, U.S. air supremacy never was remotely in doubt. Therefore, some pundits are inclined to wonder why we are spending (in the late Carl Sagan's words)
The official reason has to do with worldwide threats: We cannot assume that recent trends will continue indefinitely. After all, the last time an American plane was shot down by an enemy aircraft was 1991, and the previous air-air loss was 1972. One month's routine peacetime flying in the States is far more dangerous, statistically speaking. But there are still threats on the horizon, and some of them could represent serious opponents. We have to be ready to play in the big leagues, even if we practice in the minors.
The other reason, of course, is politics. Which is to say, money. Today, most large defense programs represent subcontractors in most states. Among 1,150 firms involved in the FA-22 program, the Raptor managed to miss only four states, while adding Puerto Rico for good measure. That translates into jobs, which translates into votes. If that seems cynical, so be it: scratch a cynic and I'll show you a realist. In short, expensive Pentagon projects combine powerful elements: jobs, votes, and power to defend America.
Besides, the record shows that on occasion America does need defending, even if only through deterrence.
China, for instance.
The PRC has one of the largest air forces on earth; it is also one of the least capable. RAND projections estimate that in 2005, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will count 120 bombers, 325 attack aircraft, and 2,000 fighters. Of the latter, half are aging J-6s (Chinese built MiG-19s of mid-1950s origin), while later designs such as Su-27s and -30s require Russian support. Airlift is surprisingly small: only 425 transports of all types for a 1.8 million man army with 40 maneuver divisions and as many brigades.
Other shortcomings include aerial tankers and airborne early warning types, while there seems to be no capability to suppress enemy air defenses. Foreign observers note a remarkable lack of integration in China's own defense network, partly due to interservice rivalry that negates joint operations.
China is upgrading some of its tactical squadrons, but slowly, and without the ability of indigenous support. In other words, 50 % of the PLAAF will be eligible for the Antique Aircraft Association. With large starting numbers, the Chinese could 'surge' hundreds of sorties against a specific area on Day One; thereafter the figures would decline dramatically, both from attrition and deferred maintenance.
Meanwhile, China has acquired SA-10s and is working on something in the SA-20 class.
Obsolete technology represents only part of the PLAAF's problems. Institutionally, it has suffered from inexperienced leadership — the first pilot to command the service only took office in 1985; the first post-Korean War pilot to lead the PLAAF assumed command nine years later. The air arm exists primarily to support the army, and probably runs behind the navy in political influence.
According to one study, Chinese aircrews lack adequate flight time. Reportedly, bomber crews average eighty hours a year, fighter pilots barely 100. The published figure of 150 hours annually for attack pilots clearly demonstrates the PLAAF's priorities: supporting the army. By comparison, NATO standards call for at least 180 hours per annum with a far wider variety of capabilities: strike, air combat, night and all-weather flight, and low- level navigation. PRC sortie generation is classed as miserable: one flight per four or five days.
In the 1990s the PLAAF began acquiring small numbers of world-class aircraft, notably Russian-built Sukhoi- 27s and -30s. SA-10 surface-to-air missiles appeared, as did Iluyshin-76 transports. But the PRC has been too cash-poor to obtain, let alone produce, such sophisticated equipment in quantity. That may explain Chinese efforts to acquire foreign technology by other means: the reputed scandals involving Israeli sales of Patriot missiles and airborne radars being two examples.
In short, if there's ever to be a fourth generation of American fighter aces, it may well come at expense of the PLAAF — though China could still win the war. In fact, in 2004 America's first Eagle ace may not yet be born.
Another potential opponent (we don't have 'enemies' anymore), of course, is post-Soviet Russia.
Russian military aviation remains potent but aging. As of 1997, Frontal Aviation included 180 bombers, 940 fighters (mainly 400 MiG-23s and 345 MiG-29s), 1,070 attack types (including 360 Su-24s), 760 recce and EW types, and 1,450 transports.
The Air Defense Force (a separate organization) included 860 fighters (300 MiG-31s), while Naval Aviation
