numbered 270 bombers or strike aircraft, 210 fighters, and almost 100 recce/EW birds.
However, despite the impressive numbers, about 70 % are late 1970s to early 1980s models, and 80 % continue operating beyond their normal overhaul period. High fatigue life will only continue to reduce availability.
The most advanced bandit flying today — and likely in the foreseeable future — is the Sukhoi-30. It is highly capable, relatively affordable (flyaway cost is pegged at under $40 million), and may be built in China and/or India. However, as of 2003 it remains in low-rate production.
The Su-30 has demonstrated adaptability to thrust vectoring (tests were flown in 1997), so presumably the option for future models remains open. But nobody has tangled with the Sukhoi yet, and based on the historic record, there is little cause for concern.
Other regional competitors such as North Korea and Cuba are nonstarters. Their pilots typically log ten to twenty hours annually, and, according to one consultant, 'They spend their flight time trying not to die.'
If history is any indicator, the next war is likely to flare up in an unexpected corner of the globe. Most likely the opponent will be a relatively small nation or alliance of such states, short on hardware but possibly long on determination and innovation. (Who, for instance, anticipated that America would be run out of Somalia by local clansmen wielding rocket-propelled grenades as effective anti-aircraft weapons?)
JOINT TACTICS
How will Raptor and JSF be employed?
Nobody's speaking for the record yet, but here are some options:
Two-plane sections will penetrate enemy airspace at supercruise or better, perhaps with three or more UAVs preceding the fighters. Drones are likely to become a familiar aspect of Raptor ops, even an essential one. They can provide decoys, overhead jamming, and perhaps enhanced SEAD capability. Control of UAVs may be from ground or airborne operators.
Raptors will live and operate with JSFs. It's entirely possible that the Bold Tigers and Wild Boars will work together in those types.
Sometime after 2012, FA-22s and F-35As would be expected to fly complementary missions. Raptors would gain air superiority over perhaps more numerous, but less capable, enemy fighters, permitting JSFs to attack targets in hostile territory. Strike planners explain that in the opening hours of conflict, F-35s carrying two one-ton precision weapons internally would dash in at supersonic speed, stealthily delivering their ordnance against command and control targets: essentially the Desert Storm scenario. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission is generally expected to proceed quickly. At least that's the plan.
Once the SEAD phase is accomplished, and stealth is presumably unnecessary, F-35s would switch to external ordnance loads. At that point, greater weight of bombs on target would offset the reduced stealthiness of the JSF, since external loadouts increase radar signatures.
Raptors also are likely to escort B-2s on deep penetration missions, affording an all stealth strike package. Based on previous experience, however, ultra high ticket items such as B-2s will still have jammer support, contrary to the Spirit's 'sales brochure' which convinced Congress that stealth bombers are self-supporting. (Before World War II, Congress accepted the Air Corps' concept of the self-escorting bomber, which would 'always get through.' While dedicated crews inevitably reached their targets, equally dedicated young National Socialists extracted a potentially prohibitive price until the advent of the P-51 Mustang. There may be a lesson for today's world.) At more than $2 billion per airframe, however, the Air Force understandably wants to hedge its bets.
Still, despite fighters and jammers, there will be losses, to our own defenses if not to the enemy. And therein lies the next phase in military aviation: pilotless aircraft.
PLANES, NOT PILOTS?
Almost fifty years ago, test pilot Scott Crossfield stated that there will always be a need for pilots because no other guidance system can be produced so cheaply by unskilled labor. While the wisdom of his humor remains uncontested, there is a growing trend toward unmanned aircraft for aerial combat.
Today, Pentagon pundits anticipate the day when drones will rule the sky. The buzzwords are many: 'pilotless aircraft,' the un-PC 'unmanned air vehicles,' and the more politically correct (and more absurd) 'uninhabited air vehicles.' All refer to the same concept — an airframe remotely controlled from the ground or another aircraft.
The phrase 'pilotless' aircraft is not strictly correct. Drones or UAVs will certainly have pilots — but not on board. The 'pilots' will control their birds via data link from afar, safely out of danger from flak, SAMs, and interceptors. There are advantages and disadvantages:
While the FA-22 may be the Air Force's last manned 'pure' fighter, the close air support mission is another matter. Though forward air controllers presumably could direct drones to battlefield targets, that's a separate issue from air superiority. At present, few people are standing up to predict CAS drones as an alternative to strike and interdiction vehicles. Friendly fire incidents are too common now: adding remote-controlled aircraft to the mix does not seem to bode well for drone use.
However, for air-to-air combat, a drone should be unbeatable. Theoretically, anyway. Once at the merge, no human could compete with a UAV pulling 20 or more Gs. With thrust vectoring, a drone would be an even more formidable dogfight opponent. The preceding, of course, assumes that the ninety-year history of aerial combat continues unimpeded, and that even in the advanced missile era, aircraft will continue meeting at 'the merge' and maneuver for a firing solution. All aspect missiles are a reality, and it remains to be seen how often increasingly rare fighter versus fighter encounters develop. 'Launch and leave' missiles that provide their own homing have vastly simplified the pilot's combat tasking, but they are complex systems that do malfunction. If history is any yardstick, there will still be some yanking and banking after the initial AAM picket is launched.
With the potential for in-flight refueling, UAVs possess almost unlimited range or endurance, since aircrew fatigue is not a factor. Looming brightest of all, of course, is the human factor. With no onboard pilot or crew, the UAV may be exposed to high threat levels without endangering a life. Or, more precisely, without endangering friendly lives.
Rating high on the disadvantage scale is SA: situational awareness. At present a drone operator, no matter how well informed by various media, cannot visually track multiple bogies (let alone bandits) like an experienced fighter pilot. On the other hand, it's been noted that drones don't come with oversized wristwatches or egos, and they don't require retirement pensions. It should be noted, however, that it's far too early to speculate upon the individual and collective mindset of increasingly youthful computer nerds who provide a growing pool of potential UAV pilots.
THEORY AND PRACTICE
All of this is well beyond the theoretical stage. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) jointly manage the effort to produce unmanned fighter aircraft. The Future Aircraft Technology Enhancements (FATE) program is working toward UAVs for air superiority, among other things.
First in line was the X-39, a designation requested by AFRL. The concept combines several technologies including advanced materials, wings that change shape rather than use ailerons, advanced computer flight controls, and artificial intelligence (no snide remarks about the intellect of fighter pilots is implied, nor should any be inferred). The project is so 'black' that at this writing it is uncertain whether an X-39 aircraft has actually been produced. Some observers speculate that its various components have been tested without assembling an entire
