In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan

Was Disarmed (Kabul: Afghan Non-Governmental Organization Security Office, March 2006).

38. Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, Better Distribution of Afghan Uniformed Police-“Close the Gap” (Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006), slide 17.

39. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.

40. Author interviews with U.S. State Department and Defense Department officials involved in police training, Afghanistan, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.

41. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.

42. Author correspondence with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, October 29, 2008. On policing during counterinsurgency and stability operations, see Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998); Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Washington, DC: RAND, 2005); Robert M. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004); David H. Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, June 2001).

43. Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.

44. Author interview with Minister Ali Jalali, September 4, 2007.

45. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.

46. Author interview with Major General Robert Durbin, January 3, 2008.

47. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, September 7, 2007.

48. Author correspondence with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, October 29, 2008.

49. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

50. The author visited the Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan in 2004 and the Office of Security Cooperation—Afghanistan in 2005, as well as regional training centers, to assess the U.S. and Coalition efforts to rebuild the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. On training of the ANA, also see Anja Manuel and P. W. Singer, “A New Model Afghan Army,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, July/August 2002, pp. 44–59; Luke Hill, “NATO to Quit Bosnia, Debates U.S. Proposals,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 40, no. 23, December 10, 2003, p. 6.

51. Anthony Davis, “Kabul’s Security Dilemma,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 37, no. 24, June 1 2, 2002, pp. 26–27; Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002), pp. 28– 30.

52. Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

53. Ibid.

54. Attrition was caused by a number of factors, such as low pay rates and apparent misunderstandings between ANA recruits and the U.S. military. For example, some Afghan soldiers believed they would be taken to the United States for training. On attrition rates, see Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, National Army (Kabul: Ministry of Defense, 2004); Capitol Hill Monthly Update, Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, June 2004); Rebuilding Afghanistan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2004). Also, author interviews with U.S. Department of Defense officials, May 2006.

55. Author interview with U.S. Army general involved in police and army training in Afghanistan, January 3, 2008.

56. Author interview with Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak, November 13, 2008.

57. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.

58. “Fighting in Afghanistan Leaves 40 Insurgents Dead,” American Forces Press Service, June 22, 2005.

59. “Coalition Launches ‘Operation Mountain Lion’ in Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, April 12, 2006.

60. U.S. Air Force F-15Es, A-10s, and B-52s provided close air support to troops on the ground engaged in rooting out insurgent sanctuaries and support networks. Royal Air Force GR-7s also provided close air support to Coalition troops in contact with enemy forces. U.S. Air Force Global Hawk and Predator aircraft provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, while KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft provided refueling support.

61. Neil Chandler and Billy Labrum, “Apache Apocalypse,” Sunday Star (UK), March 16, 2008.

62. Major Robert W. Redding, “19th SF Group Utilizes MCA Missions to Train Afghan National Army Battalions,” Special Warfare, vol. 17, February 2005, pp. 22–27.

63. Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), p. 24.

64. General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.), Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Memorandum from General McCaffrey to Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb, United States Military Academy, June 2006.

65. National Ground Intelligence Center, Afghanistan: Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Charlottesville, VA: U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center, 2004).

66. Amrullah Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan: National Directorate of Security, 2006), p. 8.

67. Presidential Office of National Security, National Threat Assessment 2004 (Kabul: Presidential Office of National Security, April 2004), p. 5.

68. Author interview with Ambassador Said Jawad, August 24, 2007.

69. Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, Afghan National Development Poll (Kabul: Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, 2005), p. 46.

70. International Security Assistance Force, Nationwide Research and Survey on Illegal State Opposing Armed Groups (ISOAGS): Qualitative and Quantitative Surveys (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, 2006), p. 120.

Chapter Eleven

1. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, Counter-Insurgency Strategy (Kabul, Afghanistan: Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, 2005), slide 14.

2. World Bank, Afghanistan—State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), p. 153.

3. Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, April 16, 2008.

4. Ibid.

5. The Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, July 2004), p. 105.

6. The question posed to Afghans was: “What is the biggest problem in your local area?” I combined the similar issues of unemployment, poverty, and poor economy into one category. See The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2006), p. 97.

7. U.S. Department of State, In Their Own Words: Afghan Views of the U.S., Karzai and the Taliban (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 2006), slides 13 and 16.

8. World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, p. xxvi.

9. Anne Evans et al., eds., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan (Kabul: World Bank, and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004), p. 145.

10. World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, p. 83.

11. Ibid., p. 86.

12. Ibid., pp. 133–34.

13. Other countries also exported electricity to Afghanistan. In May 2003, Tajikistan resumed supplying