Breakout

facts had been deliberately falsified even in such a perilous time as this mid-war period. But it is such a farrago of omissions and evasions that the tribunal must have skimped their inquiries.

The period in which this happened must be taken into account. It was right in the middle of the war. The British public were despondent enough about defeats from Dunkirk to Singapore without being dismayed further by revealing the full facts of the inefficiency which allowed the German battleships to sail unscathed past the cliffs of Dover.

The Report said:

'The Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were located at Brest after shipping raids on 28 March 1941. The 8-inch cruiser, Prinz Eugen, which left Norway in company with the Bismarck, joined the battle-cruisers in Brest after the loss of the Bismarck. She was first seen in dry-dock there on 4 June.

'A photographic reconnaissance on 29 and 31 January 1942 revealed the arrival in Brest of two destroyers, five torpedo boats and eight mine-sweepers.

'The Admiralty always maintained that the most likely and safest course for the battle-cruisers when they left Brest was to break up the Channel to German waters. They would either do this or they would break into the Atlantic. Or they might go to the Mediterranean to Genoa or go north about the British Isles to return to German waters.

'On 2 February the Admiralty reviewed the position and drew up an appreciation that the ships would most probably proceed up the Channel. This was supported by indications like the concentration of torpedo boats, E- boats, mine-sweepers and other light craft along the coast from Le Havre to the Hook.

'The strong possibility was that the enemy ships would seek to pass the narrows at Dover under the cover of darkness. The distance from Brest to the Straits is 360 miles. During the winter months they could leave Brest shortly before dusk and run up the Channel in the dark, reaching the Straits about dawn. Or they might leave Brest to lie up in Cherbourg next day to run the Straits the following night.

'The enemy's occupation of the continental seaboard from Norway to Spain had rendered the participation of our own heavy ships in the operation impracticable. [8]

'Concerning executive order Fuller, on 3 February the Admiralty ordered the C-in-C Nore to have six destroyers with torpedoes on six hours notice in the Thames estuary to operate under the orders of the Vice- Admiral, Dover. Two fast mine-layers, the Wekhman and the Manxman [9] were put on readiness and six Swordfish were sent to Manston. The submarine Sealion was ordered to join two submarines patrolling off Brest. Three squadrons of Beauforts were also put in readiness. One was at Leuchars, Scotiand, to operate against the Tirpitz at Trondheim. One squadron was at St. Eval in Cornwall. The third squadron was split up between St. Eval and Thorney Island, near Portsmouth. The Beauforts from Leuchars were ordered to Coltishall in Norfolk.

'From 10 February, 100 bombers were ordered to stand by and 11 Group of Fighter Command was also warned. [10] On 11 February two more German destroyers entered Brest, making four.

'On 11 February a photo reconnaissance showed all three ships out of dock and six destroyers in harbour.

'The submarine, H.M.S, Sealion, saw no big ships while she remained in the vicinity of Whistle Buoy until 19:00, and then withdrew on the tide from this most dangerous patrol. She surfaced south of Whistle Buoy and remained there until 20:35, but saw no enemy squadron. [11]

'On the night of 11/12 February 'Stopper' Patrol off Brest was ordered on a 12 hour patrol from 19:40 to 07:00 next day.

The first aircraft took off at 18:27; when it encountered a JU-88 it switched off the radar equipment, and when it switched on again at 19:20 the radar was unserviceable. It had blown a fuse which they could not repair, so they returned to base. The crew transferred to another aircraft and the patrol resumed at 22:38 and proceeded until 23:43. A third aircraft took over between 23-3(5 and 03:10. A fourth from 02:45 to 07:01. There was nothing seen, but there was a gap of three hours in 'Stopper' from 19:40 to 22:38.

''Line SE Patrol was between Ushant and the Ile de Brehat. It was ordered between 19:40 and 23:40 on 11 February. The aircraft reached its starting point at 19:36, when its radar became unserviceable through an obscure fault of unusual character which is still under investigation. It remained on patrol but reported the fault at 21:13 and was ordered to return. No relief plane was sent. If it were not for the technical failure of both their patrols they had an excellent chance of sighting the German squadron.

'On 12 February morning two Spitfires over Boulogne sighted E-boats leaving harbour. Under the standing order not to use wireless telegraphy, they immediately returned to base to report.

'Two Spitfires took off at 10:20 to sweep from Boulogne to Fecamp. Fifteen miles from Le Touquet, Sq. Ldr. Oxspring sighted 20–30 vessels in convoy. He landed at Hawkinge at 10:50 and the information was passed to Dover and 11 Group. [12]

^Ju-88

'Sgt. Beaumont, who was with Sq. Ldr. Oxspring, said he saw a vessel with a tripod mast and superstructure. When handed a book of German silhouettes he picked out a German capital ship.

'At 10:42, unconnected with the shipping reconnaissance, Group Captain Victor Beamish and Wing-Cdr. Boyd, when attacked by Messerschmitts, flew right over the German squadron. They observed WT silence until they landed at 11:09 and informed intelligence at 11 Group Fighter Command.

'At 10:00–10:15 surface vessels appeared on the radar detector set at Beachy Head. There were telephone delays and the line was engaged, which held up the transmission of the information which did not reach Dover until 10:40. At 10:50 enemy shipping was detected by radar at Fairlight and passed to Dover.

'The Swordfish were ordered to be airborne at 12:20 to carry out an attack at 12:45. The rendezvous for their fighter escort was 12:25 over Manston. Owing to unforeseen delays the fighters did not get there in time.

'Two squadrons from Biggin Hill Wing arrived at Manston late and proceeded towards the target. Hornchurch Wing also missed the Swordfish at Manston and they searched over Calais without success. At 12:00 six Swordfish accompanied by ten Spitfires left for the target. Ten miles off Ramsgate German fighters appeared and battled with the Spitfires.

'On the morning of 12 February there were 36 serviceable Beauforts available. There were seven planes of 217 Squadron from Leuchars in Fife, 14 of 42 Squadron at St. Eval, 15 of 86 and 217 Squadrons, except for three which were sweeping the Bay of Biscay, from Thorney Island. Four of them which were in an advanced state of readiness proceeded to Manston at 13:40 led by Pilot Officer Carson, but they arrived too late to rendezvous with the fighters. When they reached Manston, owing to the large number of aircraft circling the base, the Beaufort formation split up. [13] Having obtained a fix, Carson reached the position of the German battle-cruisers at 16:40. Visibility was bad and he dropped his torpedo at 1,500 yards but was damaged by flak. A second pilot found the Germans at 18:00 and attacked.

'The two reamining Beauforts of the original four circled the aerodrome for some time and landed at Manston and set off again. Shortly after 15:00 they found the Squadron and at 15:40 their torpedoes were observed running. The three other planes left at Thorney Island flew to Manston and at 15:00 set course for the target. The visibility was so bad they made their attack singly and one was destroyed by fighters or anti-aircraft fire.

'The Leuchars squadron was delayed because of a snowbound aerodrome but 14 serviceable Beauforts eventually arrived at Coltishall at 11:45. Three were without torpedoes and arrangements were made to send them to Coltishall but they did not arrive in time. Two had engine trouble, leaving nine which were ordered to Manston to pick up a formation of Hudsons who were to attack as a diversion. They arrived at Manston at 14:53 and accompanied by five Hudsons set off for the target at 15:34 [14]. Owing to the bad visibility they became separated and the Hudsons bombed the ships before the torpedo attacks began. Two Hudsons were lost.