Breakout

'At 16:04 the Beauforts sighted the German ships and attacked in one flight of six and one of three. Seven torpedoes were dropped but heavy anti-aircraft fire prevented observation of results. [Nothing said about the near- sinking of Pizey's flagship HMS Campbell.]

'The St. Eval detachment. At 12:20 Beauforts from St. Eval were ordered to Thorney Island. Then they were ordered to rendezvous at Coltishall by 17:00 to pick up fighter escort. At 17:01 they picked up ten fighters over Coltishall and set course for the German Squadron. At 17:41 they were over the estimated position of the ships. At 18:05 they saw German mine-sweepers. Visibility was only 100 yards and it was raining heavily. The formation split up and lost sight of each other and darkness prevented their chance of effective action.

'Destroyers. The destroyers stationed at Harwich were Campbell, Vivacious, Mackay, Whitshed, Worcester and Walpole. They were all 20 years old.

'At 11:56 Captain Pizey in Campbell the flagship set off. At 15:17 Pizey saw two large ships on his radar at nine and a half miles. At 15:43 he came under heavy fire from the German ships. But they fired their torpedoes and Worcester fired her torpedoes from 2,400 yards. She was badly hit by the German shells and set on fire but managed to limp back to port.

'At 11:27 242 bombers set off and continued to fly throughout the afternoon. Thirty-nine attacked, 188 failed to find the ships and fifteen did not return. Twelve aircraft succeeded in laying mines which eventually damaged the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. [In fact, the damage was done by mines laid much earlier.]

'Fighter Command. 11 Group had 21 Spitfire squadrons and four Hurricane squadrons. Also three squadrons from 10 Group and six squadrons from 12 Group took part in the battle. In all thirty-four fighter squadrons launched the most intensive fighter attack. Most of the attacks were launched at 14:05–15:05 to cover the Beaufort torpedo attacks. Out of a total of 398 fighter planes, 17 were missing.'

The Beport then set out its conclusions.

'Co-ordination of plans. Was there any lack of proper contact between services and command? It must be remarked that there is such a thing as too much co-ordination. If the Germans came up the Channel the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff predicted it would be A simple battle — all forces should be thrown into action at the earliest possible time.''

Then came a small note of criticism:

'Co-ordination was not entirely successful. For example, in the provision of escorts for the Swordfish. But later co-operation between the commands seems to have been complete [unfortunately, too late]. In these circumstances we have no suggestion to make for improvements of arrangements which already exist for the purpose of ensuring adequate liaison and co-operation between services and commands, which in our opinion proved on the whole to be satisfactory. There is no lack of evidence of co-operation or the will to co-operate.

'It must also be admitted that in addition to the short notice when information was received on the presence of the German ships they were to some extent caught by surprise. The general opinion of those dealing with the problem was that they would pass through the Straits at night. In addition, it must be remembered that an attack by destroyers or a handful of MTBs in broad daylight against capital ships, not themselves under heavy fire, was an adventure hitherto hardly regarded as justifiable.

'The Air Ministry, in receipt of the message that the German ships were in the Channel, sent to Fighter and Coastal commands this message: 'Scharnhorst and Gneisenau reported in Channel sixteen miles west of Le Touquet at 11.05. Plus abnormal enemy air activity. Maximum available forces to be employed as early as possible to destroy the enemy ships and aircraft. 'This unique opportunity to be exploited to the utmost.'

'After spending 15 days on this inquiry this Board is impressed by the countless acts of gallantry that came to their notice and the evident determination of all our forces to press home their attacks.'

The only other faint note of criticism was contained in this paragraph:

'Apart from the weakness of our forces, the main reason for our failure to do more damage to the enemy was the fact that his presence was not detected earlier and this was due to a breakdown of night patrols and the omission to send out strong morning reconnaissance. All operational orders said they would pass through in darkness.'

It is a collector's piece of officialese and double talk. Nearly 700 fighters and bombers — the entire force at the disposal of the RAF — had been flung into the battle without success because they were too late and completely unco-ordinated. Thirteen young Fleet Air Arm pilots had been sent uselessly to their deaths. Twenty- seven young sailors had been killed and eighteen seriously wounded aboard the destroyer Worcester when she took on a German battleship and cruiser single-handed — a piece of pitiful heroism which need never have happened if the Navy had brought in bigger ships.

Security was so rigid that hundreds of other young RAF pilots took off with no idea what they were looking for. One RAF squadron leader had reported by radio that German battleships were in the Channel — and been ignored. Another officer, a group captain, had not even broken radio silence in spite of the great urgency. Some RAF torpedo planes, taking off in confusion, had attacked and nearly sank our own destroyers. RAF night reconnaissance patrols over the Channel returned and were not replaced, leaving a gap of three vital hours. Except for hitting three mines, the battleships reached Germany untouched under the noses of the most battle-experienced air force and navy in the world.

The unpalatable truth which Churchill dared not reveal to the angry and disturbed British public was that some of his service chiefs had proved themselves tragically incompetent. For Hitler had been right. The carefully prepared German dash uncovered a lack of liaison and organization. Looking back, it makes one apprehensively wonder what might have been the outcome if the Fuhrer had gone ahead with his plans to invade Britain.

The break-out of the battleships was a supreme example of meticulous German planning and efficiency defeating the hasty last-minute improvisations of the British.

Perhaps the main trouble was the short-sighted arrogance on the part of the British forces. Admittedly there were disasters against the Japanese in the East. But the Army had escaped miraculously from Dunkirk and the RAF had won the Battle of Britain. The Royal Navy had a centuries-old tradition of paramountcy behind it. The Admiralty simply did not regard a German dash up the English Channel as a serious possibility. Hence their pitiful dispositions. In the case of the newer service, the RAF at this time of the war reckoned to have the Luftwaffe on the run. They were flying an increasing number of fighter sweeps over France and every night mounting an even more devastating bomber offensive over Germany.

This somewhat smug attitude in all services as well as the petty rivalries, even among commands, were the basic reasons for the disasters of the day. But how could Churchill tell the nation that — particularly as it included incompetence at his beloved Admiralty?

Fighter Command Chief Sir Sholto Douglas commented later: 'At the time I was at a loss to understand the reluctance of the Royal Navy to have units of the Home Fleet ready to send out into the North Sea. The prizes to be gained in an action with ships of the importance of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and the Prinz Eugen would have been worth bringing some of our bigger ships into action in time to intercept the German warships while they were still at sea. As it was, the enemy warships got away with it, even though they did hit some mines which failed to do more than slight damage, and they all made the safety of their home ports.'

The Germans had their complaints too. German Navy Chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, was equally critical of the Luftwaffe. He wrote in his report:

'The Navy opinion was that with sufficient air defence the big ships could remain stationed in Brest even if