Breakout

British battleships were stationed at Plymouth and Portsmouth. The Luftwaffe could have considerably eased the task of the German ships by attacking British air bases. But as was constantly shown the Navy was dependent here upon the goodwill of the Luftwaffe.

'Numerous reports about the air attacks on Brest deeply impressed the Fuhrer. He followed them continuously with concern and did not look with any favour on the operations of the big ships. This feeling, without doubt, was reinforced by Goring, who emphasized to the Fuhrer again and again that there was just no sensible way to protect the big ships in Brest against air attack. In fact it did not lie in Goring's power nor in his wish. He therefore robbed us of a chance to do something worthwhile in convoy raiding.

'At the end of 1941, when the question of the transfer of the ships to the North Sea came up, the Fuhrer produced a number of arguments for stationing the ships in Norway. Many reports of landings in Norway by the British in the spring played a considerable part in his case. Added to this, the ships in Brest were being damaged and remained inactive. When the question of a break-out was looked into, the Iceland passage was deemed unfavourable because the British, noting the absence of the ships from Brest, would have enough time to bring out their Home Fleet and concentrate it in the North Sea. Therefore if it were to come to a break-out, it must be through the Channel which would bring surprise. At the beginning of 1942, when we prepared to sail through the Channel, we hoped that the break-through might not be noticed by the enemy, but we were also prepared for a short sharp battle and an exchange of shots.'

XIV BUT WHO REALLY WON?

In spite of the whitewash of the Bucknill Tribunal some officers were secretly sacked or posted away. Admiral Ramsay was not a scapegoat as he had gloomily predicted — but a lot of other people were. They were not sacked, as that would have undermined public confidence, but kicked upstairs to harmless jobs. One of them, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, C-in-C of Coastal Command, was removed to Mountbatten's staff in Ceylon with the backwater job of Director of Information and Civil Affairs. Others known to be hostile to the official 'whitewash,' were posted away. Wing-Cdr. Constable-Roberts was exiled to Scapa Flow, but managed to get a squadron in North Africa shortly afterwards.

Gerald Kidd applied to go on the Dieppe raid, but instead had a message to report for what he regarded as a 'stooge job.' As he had heard a rumour that he would never get another operational job as a result of the report he had put in, he sent a letter to Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory to protest about being posted away without explanation. He said, 'There is a rumour that there are orders I am not to be involved in any further operations along the south coast. I want to protest against this.'

He also requested to see Leigh-Mallory. Much to Kidd's surprise, he agreed to see him one evening at 11 Group at Uxbridge. His manner was unfriendly as he said, 'What do you want, Kidd?' Kidd replied, 'Why have I been taken off the Dieppe raid?'

Leigh-Mallory said abruptly, 'Sit down, Kidd.' He then produced a copy of his report and said, 'This is balderdash, bunkum and bilge. I strongly resent being ordered by the Air Council to answer a letter from a junior officer.'

Kidd replied stiffly, 'I am sorry, sir, that you regard it that way. But the facts are correct. I wrote it after what was to me a tremendous shock and a great sense of personal loss.'

Leigh-Mallory repeated, 'I want to make it quite clear that I resent a junior officer criticizing me.'

Kidd answered, 'It is not intended as a criticism of you. It is a general criticism.'

In clipped tones, Leigh-Mallory said, 'Take paragraph E., which reads, 'This was the chance which Fighter Command had been waiting for for over a year… nevertheless, the effort of our fighter squadrons was made far too late and when it came it was badly directed, in so far as many of the squadrons failed to reach their objective.'

Kidd replied by drawing his attention to the fact that his report made it clear there was 'no lack of courage and desire to defeat the enemy.'

Leigh-Mallory said, 'I agree with everything except the paragraph that affects me. We could have won a resounding victory, but I could get no co-operation from Joubert of Coastal Command. It was as if we were fighting a different war.'

Having made this astonishing confession to a junior officer, he became suddenly genial. The interview ended on friendly terms, when he introduced Kidd to his staff over a drink. He also promised to promote him — and kept his word.

There were several other echoes of the day's defeat. At Biggin Hill Fighter Base, Flt.-Lt. Cowan Douglas- Stephenson always kept a personal log giving details of every event that happened on the airfield from the condition of the runways to individual take-offs. He said, 'I was posted shortly afterwards to Hornchurch. Later when I returned to Biggin, I found the pages from Saturday, 3 January, to Wednesday, 25 March, 1942 had been cut out with a razor blade. Why? Every other entry was intact.'

Stephenson is still convinced this was a deliberate act by someone in authority to lose the record of what took place at one of Britain's most vital fighter airfields that February day. They cut out a much larger section so that the excision of 12 February would not appear too obvious.

Barely a month after the break-out on 17 March 1942, the London Gazette gave details of RAF awards for the action. They included a DFM (Distinguished Flying Medal) to Hudson pilot, Flight Sergeant J. W. Creedon of 407 Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron, 'who made a daring low-level attack on a German destroyer escorting the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Creedon came out through cloud to 400 feet and sighted a destroyer directly below him. Diving through fierce flak to 200 feet he released his bombs which straddled the German warship. As he turned away to climb back into the clouds, he was attacked by a JU-88. But when Creedon's rear-gunner opened fire with his turret guns the German sheered off.'

For his gallant single-handed attack Pilot Officer Carson of 217 Squadron received the somewhat inadequate decoration of the DFC (Distinguished Flying Cross). The London Gazette also announced other RAF awards to 42 Squadron. They included the award of the DSO (Distinguished Service Order) to the other man who flew off without waiting for orders, Sq. Ldr. Cliff, and the DFC to Pilot Officer Archer. Pilot Officer Pett was also awarded a DFC.

The London Gazette said, 'The King has been graciously pleased to approve the following awards in recognition of gallantry displayed in flying operations against the enemy. On the afternoon of 12 February 1942, a force of Beaufort and Hudson aircraft carried out an attack on enemy naval forces, including the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, off the Dutch coast. In the face of harassing fire from screening destroyers, the attack was pressed home with the utmost determination at very close range. Although it has not been possible to assess the damage, owing to the extremely poor visibility, it is believed that several hits were obtained. The operation, which demanded a high degree of skill and courage, reflects the greatest credit upon the following officers and airmen who participated.

'Squadron Ldr. Cliff was the leader of the formation, a squadron of Coastal Command Beaufort torpedo bombers, which delivered a formation attack on one of the two larger ships. Hudsons of the RCAF also took part in the attacks. Three Beauforts and two Hudsons were lost.

'At least two hits are believed to have been scored by Squadron Leader Cliffs squadron and the crews of the other Beauforts saw torpedoes running towards the target, as they turned away into the mist and drizzle with flak bursting round them and enemy fighters on their tails. Because of bad weather it was difficult to find the convoy and only good navigation brought them to the right spot. For some, the first indication that they had arrived came from flak bursting near them fired from unseen ships.'

There seems little doubt that to cover their own unforgivable inadequacies, Coastal Command rushed to recommend as many medals as they could to the courageous pilots.

The Navy also gave medals to its heroes, as well as the posthumous VC awarded to Lt.-Cdr. Esmonde, all the Sword-fish survivors were decorated. The four sub-lieutenants, Brian Rose, Edgar Lee, Charles Kingsmill and 'Mac' Samples, were all given the DSO. The only surviving rating, Gunner Donald Bunce, was awarded the CGM