secret; but, failing that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to stumble also.'
[3] Or add, ''What is this among things? and what is its definition?' --such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an answer.'
Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?
Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered).[4]
[4] Or, 'A supreme excellence, no doubt.'
Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is?[5]
[5] Or, 'can you give me a definition of the pious man?'; 'tell me who and what the pious man is.'
I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.
Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one likes?
Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.
Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?
I think so (he answered).
Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his knowledge?[6] Is it not so?
[6] i.e. 'his practice must square with his knowledge and be the outward expression of his belief?'
Euth. That is so.[7]
[7] 'That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind and persuasion.'
Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?[8]
[8] 'As he should and must.' See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way?[9]
[9] Or, 'he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honour to Heaven lawfully.'
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought?[10]
[10] 'As he should and must.'
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition?
So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied).[11]
[11] 'I accept it at any rate as mine.' N.B.--in reference to this definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein}, which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented to.
Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases?[12]
[12] Or, 'may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to his fancy?' See above, II. vii. 8.
Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man[13] who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with which our dealings with one another must be conducted.[14]
[13] Or, 'he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who knows,' etc.
[14] Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud. {allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai}, translate 'must be specifically conducted.'
Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought?[15]
[15] 'As they should and must.'
Obviously (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly--is it not so?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in respect of human affairs?
That would seem to follow (he replied).
Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
Without a doubt, (he answered).
Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?
What the laws ordain (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought?[16]
[16] 'What they should and must.'
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?[17]
[17] This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--
A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are righteous and just.
B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound, cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as 'Those who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just) concerning men.'
I should say so myself (he answered).
Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?
I should not (he answered).
Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them?[18]
[18] Or, 'and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines that he must and should not do it?'
No, I suppose not (he answered).
Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do?[19]
[19] Or, 'and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he thinks he should do?'
No, I do not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful[20] as concerning men does the things that are just and right?
[20] Or, 'of lawful obligation.'
Without a doubt (he answered).
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?[21]
[21] N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel, op. cit. p. 323 foll., 'Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen Dialogs.'
Who else, if not? (he replied).
Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as concerning men?
That is my opinion (he answered).
Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know,[22] or are there any who are wise in what they know not?
[22] Or, 'in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme}).'
Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know;[23] for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?
