[23] Or, 'their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the {episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge of?'
Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?
Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.
Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
Euth. So it appears to me.
Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?
Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.
Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all- wise?
Quite impossible (he answered).
Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?
Euth. That is my opinion.[24]
[24] Cf. Plat. 'Theaet.' 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.
Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?
What way? (he asked).
Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?
No, I should say not (he answered).
Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?
Decidedly (he replied).
Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say?[25]
[25] Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai to ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai to ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1) 'and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?' lit. 'could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good (or a good)?' or else (2) 'and what is beneficial is good (or a good)? or is it anything else?'
Nothing else (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?
That is how it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?[26]
[26] i.e. 'beautiful in all relations into which it enters.' Reading {to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon e soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma Di', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the many interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R. Kuhner ad loc.
Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself.[27]
[27] Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an} above, translate 'I certainly cannot, I confess.'
Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?
Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance.[28]
[28] Or, 'I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this, that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular thing is useful?'--'That nobody can deny (he answered).' It is impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi- argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.
Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
Euth. No single thing else.
Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?
So it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And what of courage,[29] Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage among things beautiful? It is a noble quality?[30]
[29] Or, perhaps better, 'fortitude.' See H. Sidgwick, 'Hist. of Ethics,' p. 43.
[30] It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425 foll.
Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).
Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.
Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of madmen and cowards would be courageous.
Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not dreadful, are they--
Euth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness knows.
Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face of the same to be cowards?
Certainly I should (he answered).
Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to noble account?[31]
[31] {kalos khresthai}, lit. 'make a beautiful use of them.'
No; these and these alone (he answered).
Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same occurrences, it would seem, are bad?
Who else, if not they? (he asked).
Soc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these circumstances as they think they must and should?[32]
[32] Or, 'feel bound and constrained to do.'
Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).
Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with them?[33]
[33] Or, 'Can it be said that those who are unable to cope nobly with their perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal with them?'
I presume not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to behave are also those who have the power?[34]
[34] 'He who kens can.'
Yes; these, and these alone (he said).
Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances we are discussing?
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some egregious blunder?
Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.
Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know[35] how to cope with terrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail utterly of this are cowards?
[35] 'Who have the {episteme}.'
So I judge them to be (he answered).[36]
[36] N.B.--For this definition of courage see Plat. 'Laches,' 195 A and passim; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.
A kingdom and a tyrrany[37] were, he opined, both of them forms of government, but forms which differed
