from one another, in his belief; a kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law, whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.
[37] Or, 'despotism.'
There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the case where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best);[38] where the title to office depended on rateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly, where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office, that was a democracy (or rule of the people).
[38] Or, 'in which the due discharge of lawful (law-appointed) obligations gave the title to magisterial office and government, this form of polity he held to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best).' See Newman, op. cit. i. 212, 235.
Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person.[39] Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the underlying proposition,[40] as thus:
[39] Or, 'if any one encountered him in argument about any topic or person without any clear statement, but a mere ipse dixit, devoid of demonstration, that so and so,' etc.
[40] Or, 'question at bottom.' Cf. Plat. 'Laws,' 949 B.
Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that this other whom I admire?
The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.
Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work or function of a good citizen?
The Disputant. Let us do so.
Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the expenditure of the state?[41]
[41] Or, 'In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consist in his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?'
Certainly (the disputant would answer).
Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her antagonists?
The Disputant. Clearly.
Soc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends in place of enemies?
That I should imagine (replies the disputant).
Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party strife and fostering civic concord?
The Disputant. That is my opinion.
By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting- point, even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become manifest to his mind.
His own--that is, the Socratic--method of conducting a rational discussion[42] was to proceed step by step from one point of general agreement to another: 'Herein lay the real security of reasoning,'[43] he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the common assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying that Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring orator,[44] because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one commonly accepted opinion to another.
[42] Of, 'of threading the mazes of an argument.'
[43] Reading {tauton asphaleian}; aliter. {tauten ten asphaleian} = 'that this security was part and parcel of reasoning.'
[44] 'Od.' viii. 171, {o d' asphaleos agoreuei}, 'and his speech runs surely on its way' (Butcher and Lang), where Odysseus is describing himself. Cf. Dion. Hal. 'de Arte Rhet.' xi. 8.
VII
The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him,[1] is, I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time, as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all transactions suited to their powers.
[1] Or, 'who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what has been said.'
Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything which it befits the true gentleman[2] to know; or where he was deficient in knowledge himself,[3] he would introduce his friends to those who knew.[4] He did not fail to teach them also up to what point it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any particular matter.[5]
[2] Lit. 'a beautiful and good man.'
[3] Or, 'where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself.' See, for an instance, 'Econ.' iii. 14.
[4] 'To those who had the special knowledge'; 'a connoisseur in the matter.'
[5] Or, 'of any particular branch of learning'; 'in each department of things.'
To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a portion of it for cultivation,[6] and in every case by geometric rule.[7] That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn, that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement, depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams.[8] What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself.[9] These things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to hinder him from many other more useful studies.[10]
[6] {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or 'and to explain the process.' Cf. Plat. 'Rep.' vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for other interpretations of the phrase. Cf. Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 7.
[7] Or, 'by correct measurement'; lit. 'by measurement of the earth.'
[8] Cf. Aristot. 'Pol.' v. (viii.) 2; Cic. 'Acad. Post.' I. iv. 15. For the attitude compare the attitude of a philosopher in other respects most unlike Socrates--August Comte, e.g. as to the futility of sidereal astronomy, 'Pos. Pol.' i. 412 (Bridges).
[9] Cf. Isocr. 'On the Antidosis,' 258-269, as to the true place of 'Eristic' in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.
[10] Cf. A. Comte as to 'perte intellectuelle' in the pursuit of barren studies.
Again, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in the study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know enough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or the season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or sea--the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; [11] and in general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season, or with the month, or the year,[12] it was well to have such reliable data to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and seasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from night sportsmen,[13] pilots of vessels, and many others who make it their business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy so far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside our own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement,[14] or wearing oneself out endeavouring to discover their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes,[15] all this he strongly discountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more than in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed[16] in the subtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these, again, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's lifetime, and to keep him away from many more useful pursuits.
[11] Schneid. cf. Plat. 'Rep.' vii. 527 D.
[12] 'Occurrences connected with the night, the month, or year.' e.g. the festival of the Karneia, the {tekmerion} (point de repere) of which is the full moon of August. Cf. Eur. 'Alc.' 449.
[13] See Plat. 'Soph.' 220 D; above, III. xi. 8; 'Cyrop.' I. vi. 40; 'Hunting,' xii. 6; Hippocr. 'Aer.' 28.
[14] See Lewis, 'Astron. of the Ancients'; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 144.
[15] Or, 'the causes of these.'
[16] {oude touton ge anekoos en}. He had 'heard,' it is said, Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cic. 'Tusc.'
