101. See the memoirs of Ribbentrop’s secretary during his time in London, Reinhard Spitzy, So haben wir das Reich verspielt. Bekenntnisse eines Illegalen, Munich, 1986, 101–3; Weinberg I, 275; Bloch, 100, 110, 111–34 (and note to 111 attributing the appellation to cartoonist David Low); Michalka, Ribbentrop, 157–8, for Ribbentrop’s lengthy absences.
102. Josef Henke, ‘Hitlers England-Konzeption — Formulierung und Realisierungsversuche’, in Funke, 584– 603, here 592; Speer, 86; Fritz Wiedemann, Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte, Velbert/Kettwig, 1964, 152, 156 and 153–6 for the Duke of Windsor’s visit to the Berghof on 22 October 1937. According to Wiedemann (p.156) Hitler thought the Duke the most intelligent prince he had met, and that it was no wonder, because he was so pro-German, that he had been forced to abdicate.
103. Bloch, 122–3. Awkwardly for the readiness of Hitler and Ribbentrop to portray Winston Churchill as the arch-warmonger and leading exponent of anti-German sentiment in Britain, Churchill had been a staunch supporter of the King throughout the abdication crisis.
104. Cit. Jonathan Wright and Paul Stafford, ‘Hitler, Britain, and the Ho?bach Memorandum’, Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 42 (1987), 94, from BA, ZSlg., 101. Nr. 31 (Dertinger report). The deteriorating relations between Britain and Germany during the second half of 1936 and in 1937 are thoroughly examined by Josef Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkul, 1935–1939, Boppard am Rhein, 1973, 49–107 and — emphasizing the significance of the colonial question — Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919– 1945, Munich, 1969, 491 — 548. See also Dietrich Aigner, Das Ringen um England, Munich/Esslingen, 1969, 302–20.
105. Weinberg I, 264.
106. DGFP, C, V, 756–60, N0.446.
107. Weinberg I, 268–71. On the background to the Agreement, see Jurgen Geyl, Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss, 1931–1938, London/New York/Toronto, 1963, ch.V.
108. Geyl, 133–4.
109. Hohne, 364. Mussolini’s decision to intervene in Spain was independent of Hitler’s. The initial limited aid followed a similar pattern, though Italian involvement soon escalated to a level far greater than that of Germany. See Paul Preston, ‘Mussolini’s Spanish Adventure: From Limited Risk to War’, in Preston and Mackenzie, 21–51.
110. 110. See Preston, Franco, 243–4. 111. Treue, 205.
111. CP, 44, 47; Hohne, 364; Pierre Milza, Mussolini, Paris, 1999, 695–7.
112. Manfred Funke, ‘Die deutsch-italienischen Beziehungen — Antibolschewismus und au?en-politische Interessenkonkurrenz als Strukturprinzip der “Achse”’, in Funke, 823–46, here 834–5; Hohne, 364. Mussolini had expressed his own approval of the agreement between Austria and Germany — one he had suggested to Schuschnigg — at his meeting with Frank on 23 September (CP, 45).
113. CP, 56.
114. CP, 59.
115. CP, 57.
116. CP, 56–60; Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933–1936, Tubingen, 1973, 491; Hohne, 364–5.
117. CP, 60; Petersen, 492; Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis. A History of the Relations between Hitler and Mussolini, New York/London, 1949, 68.
118. Treue, 205.
119. CP, 58.
120. Despite his racial disparagement of the Japanese as merely capable of ‘bearing’, not ‘creating’, culture, Hitler had encouraged Ribbentrop in 1933, according to the latter’s testimony at Nuremberg (IMG, x.271), to explore closer relations with Japan, predominantly on ideological grounds. See John Fox, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1938. A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology, Oxford, 1982, 175–6; and Theo Sommer, Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Machten 1935–1940. Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimachtepakt, Tubingen, 1962, 21–2; and, for Hitler’s race-views on Japan, MK, 319. The first soundings to Japan were made in January 1935 (Bernd Martin, ‘Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen wahrend des Dritten Reiches’, in Funke, 454–70, here 460).
121. For the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ‘Zur Struktur der NS-Au?enpolitik 1933– 1945’, in Funke, 137–85, here 162–4.
122. Fox, 182–3, suggests this was only in autumn 1935.
123. Martin, 459; Fox, 185; Hartmut Blo?, ‘Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich’, in Funke, 407–29, here especially 409–11.
124. Martin, 460; Fox, 177.
125. Fox, 180–81.
126. Martin, 461–2 and n.34, 40; Weinberg I, 344–5; Fox, 199–204. The planned coup d’etat by junior officers followed elections in February 1936 with an outcome which did not satisfy the army, engaged in conflict with the navy over allocation of resources and strategic planning for expansion. The conflict lasted into the summer before a compromise gave equal weight to the navy’s pressure for expansion to the south and the army’s strong preference for a continental policy looking to expand northwards. Eventually, adventurist elements in the government were able to advance towards a pact, but the disruption following the army revolt held matters up for some time.
127. Hohne, 368; Martin, 464 n.54 for Italy’s joining on 6 November 1937.
128. See Weinberg I, 347.
129. Domarus, 668.
130. IMG, xxv.404, 409, Doc. 386-PS.
131. Die kirchliche Lage in Bayern nach den Regierungsprasidentenberichten 1933– 1943, vol.i, ed. Helmut Witetschek, Mainz, 1966, 193.
132. Domarus, 668; Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945, Mainz, 1980, 15.
133. Schmidt, 348.
134. Schmidt, 342–6. See also the extensive account of Lloyd George’s visit by Thomas Jones, who accompanied him on his trip to Germany and noted how impressed he was with Hitler (Jones, 241–52). Just over a year later, Lloyd George wrote to a friend: i have never doubted the fundamental greatness of Herr Hitler… I have never withdrawn one particle of the admiration which I personally felt for him… I only wish we had a man of his supreme quality at the head of affairs in our country today.’ Cit. Martin Gilbert, Britain and Germany between the Wars, London, 1964, 102. And see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.1: The Gathering Storm, London 1948, 224–5: ‘No one was more completely misled than Mr Lloyd George, whose rapturous accounts of his conversations make odd reading today. There is no doubt that Hitler had a power of fascinating men…’
135. Schmidt, 350; TBJG, I/3, 119, 142 (21 April 1937,12 May 1937). See Lansbury’s comment in a private letter written on 11 May 1937: ‘…A soft word, a tiny recognition of Hitler’s position by diplomats, would make all the difference… He will not go to war unless pushed into it by others.
136. He knows how a European war will end.’ Cit. Gilbert, 102. Lansbury had roundly condemned Hitler in the book he had published the previous year (George Lansbury, My England, London, n.d. (1936), 193–6).
137. Schmidt, 349–50.
138. Andre Francois-Poncet, Souvenirs d’une ambassade a Berlin, Septembre 1931- Octobre 1938, Paris, 1946, 262.
139. Cit. Ludwig Volk, ‘Kardinal Faulhabers Stellung zur Weimarer Republik und zum NS-Staat’, Stimmen der Zeit, 177 (1966), 173–95, here 187.
140. Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgesprache im Fuhrerhauptquartier 1941–1942, ed. Percy Ernst Schramm, Stuttgart, 1963, 478 (26 July 1942).
141. August Kubizek, Adolf Hitler, mein Jugendfreund, 5th edn, Graz/Stuttgart,
