London, 1969, 238–44. In the most spectacular of the ‘incidents’, the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station, Polish uniforms were not used (as some post-war testimony claimed), and were not necessary. An SS guard had already taken over the watch on the station to ensure the success of the operation when, as pre-arranged, five SD men dressed in civilian clothes entered the building to carry out the attack (Jurgen Runzheimer, ‘Der Uberfall auf den Sender Gleiwitz im Jahre 1939’, VfZ, 10 (1962), 408–26).
282. Shirer, 152.
283. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18473, LR Ebermannstadt, 31 August 1939. See also DBS, vi.980–83; Steinert, 91ff.; Wolfram Wette, ‘Zur psychologischen Mobilmachung der deutschen Bevolkerung 1933–1939’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Analysen- Grundzuge-Forschungsbilanz, Munich-Zurich, 1989, 205–23, here 220; and DRZW, i.142.
284. Horst Rohde, ‘Kriegsbeginn 1939 in Danzig — Planungen und Wirklichkeit’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 462–81, here 462, 472–7, 479 n.1; Levine, 153; Domarus, 1307–8. It should have been the cruiser Konigsberg, but that ship had developed engine trouble (Levine, Hitler’s Free City, 152). See Baumgart, 147, for Liebmann’s report of the conversation he overheard between Raeder and Hitler following the meeting on the Berghof on 22 August. Raeder remarked that the Schleswig-Holstein would probably be sunk by Polish coastal batteries with the loss of 300 or so sea-cadets. Hitler replied with a dismissive wave of the hand. In fact, the attack on the Westerplatte did not go according to plan. The Luftwaffe had to intervene before the Westerplatte was finally taken on the afternoon of 1 September, by which time the Germans had lost between 40 and 50 men (Rohde, 474– 5).
285. Halder KTB, i.52 (1 September 1939), trans. Halder Diary, 47.
286. Levine, Hitler’s Free City, 153.
287. Domarus, 1308.
288. Shirer, 156. See Henderson’s impressions, 287–91; and those of Dahlerus, 123–4.
289. Domarus, 1311, cit. Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 1 September 1939.
290. Shirer, 156; Domarus, 1316 and n.901. Below, 195 contradicts Shirer’s impressions, stating that Hitler was received with far more cheering than usual, which broke out repeatedly through his speech. Shirer’s contemporary account is probably to be preferred. Hellmuth Groscurth, a rooted opponent of Hitler in the Abwehr, noted in his diary: ‘10.00a.m. Reichstag speech. Terrible impression everywhere’ (Groscurth, 196).
291. Domarus, 1315; text of speech 1312–17. As regards the timing of the start of hostilities, Hitler appears simply to have made a mistake (Rohde, 479 n.1).
292. Dahlerus, 124–5.
293. See the references to Mussolini’s peace efforts in Chamberlain’s speeches in the House of Commons on 1 and 2 September 1939: Documents, 161, No.105, 172, No.116; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 501–2, 507–8, Nos. 700, 710; and Weinberg II, 640–41.
294. Domarus, 1319; DGFP, D, VII, 485–9, Nos. 504, 505, 507. In the evening of 3 September, Hitler thanked Mussolini for his efforts and explained why Germany was now at war with Great Britain and France (DGFP, D, VII, 538–9, No.565).
295. Dahlerus, 125–6. And see Hofer, Entfesselung, 392–3.
296. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the British Foreign Office, was brisk in his reply when Dahlerus telephoned him on the early afternoon of 1 September, after his meeting with Hitler (Dahlerus, 127; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 479–80, Nos.651–2). Cadogan had already noted in his diary on 28 August that the ‘masses of messages from Dahlerus…don’t amount to much unless one can infer from them that Hitler has cold feet’ (The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 203). Dahlerus’s frantic last efforts to engineer a visit by Goring to London were no more than whistling in the wind (Dahlerus, 136–7). In an interview on BBC-TV on 14 September 1997, Sir Frank Roberts (then a prominent diplomat in the Foreign Office, later, in the 1960s, British Ambassador to Moscow, then Bonn), who took the call from Dahlerus on the morning of 3 September, after the British ultimatum had been issued, recalled that he had not thought it worth passing on the message to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax.
297. DGFP, VII, 527–8, N0.558; DBFP, 3rd Ser., IX, 539, App.IV; Weinberg, ii.649–50.
298. Henderson, 278–9; Documents, 168–9, No.109–11; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 492, No.682.
299. Documents, 175, No.118; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 521, 535, Nos.732, 757.
300. Schmidt, 472; Henderson, 284.
301. Documents, 175, No.118; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 535, No.757; German reply, DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 539–41, N0.766; Domarus, 1336–8.
302. Documents, 179, No.120.
303. Halder KTB, i.58 (3 September 1939); TBJG, I/7, 91 (4 September 1939); DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 538, No.764.
304. See IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.56.
305. Schmidt, 473. Doubts have been expressed about the accuracy of Schmidt’s account (Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Hitler and England, 1933–1945: Pretense and Reality’, German Studies Review, 8 (1985), 299–309, here 306). Certainly, Schmidt’s memoirs contain errors. However, Schmidt was present on the occasion, and Hitler’s response was short enough and striking enough for the interpreter to have remembered it correctly, even several years later. What might, perhaps, be justifiably doubted is whether Schmidt grasped Hitler’s meaning; whether Hitler was not simply asking Ribbentrop in practical terms about what the next step would be. The reported response (Schmidt, 473) of the Foreign Minister, ‘I presume that the French will hand us a similar-sounding ultimatum in the next hour,’ points in this direction.
306. Documents, 157, No.105.
307. L.B. Namier, Conflicts. Studies in Contemporary History, London, 1942, 57.
308. Klemperer, 112–29; Watt, How War Came, 390–94; Meehan, especially ch.7; Lamb, 105–8. Some of the clearest warnings of the need for Britain to take a firm stand against Hitler were passed on in the spring and summer by Lieutenant-Colonel von Schwerin, head of the ‘Foreign Armies West’ section of the Army High Command’s Intelligence Department. The Foreign Office was, however, largely dismissive of his information. ‘As usual the German army trusts us to save them from the Nazi regime,’ was the minute of one prominent diplomat, Frank K. Roberts (Klemperer, 119). I am grateful to R. A. C. Parker for referring me to reports on Schwerin in PRO, FO 371/22990 and FO 371/22968.
309. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946, ii.138. Gisevius did not claim these were Oster’s exact words, but was adamant that they represented his meaning.
310. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946; ii.140.
311. See Muller, Heer, 414–19.
312. Watt, How War Came, 394–404.
313. See Kube, 319; Martens, 199–200; Irving, Goring, 268, 272.
314. Bloch, 261. Similar thoughts were current in Berlin on the very day of the British declaration (Shirer, 159).
315. According to Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 115–16, the photographer found Hitler at the height of the crisis in August 1939 slumped in his chair in the Reich Chancellery, just after a visit by Ribbentrop, bitterly criticizing the Foreign Office. ‘I knew, of course, exactly what he meant,’ Hoffmann wrote. ‘Again and again I had myself heard Ribbentrop, with an aplomb and self-confidence out of all proportion to his knowledge and his faulty powers of judgment, assure Hitler that Britain was degenerate, that Britain would never fight, that Britain would certainly never go to war to pull someone else’s chestnuts out of the fire…’
316. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, 43: ‘Hitler glaubte nicht an einen Krieg mit den Westmachten, weil er nicht daran glauben wollte. Wie weit Ribbentrop mitverantwortlich war fur diesen Glauben, wird sich wohl kaum mehr feststellen lassen. Aus der Verschiedenheit der beiden Charaktere und auf Grund der ganzen Atmosphare im
