44. DBS, vi.1032.
45. Ortwin Buchbender and Reinhold Sterz (eds.), Das andere Gesicht des Krieges. Deutsche Feldpostbriefe 1939–1945, Munich, 1982, 41.
46. See Shirer, 173.
47. MadR, ii.331.
48. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 143–6.
49. See Broszat, Polenpolitik, 41ff.; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14–18, 186ff.
50. In his discussion with Army Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch on 22 September, Heydrich agreed to withdraw the order — which had come, it was claimed, directly from Hitler’s train — to shoot insurgents without trial (Groscurth, 360–61).
51. Heydrich demanded, in his discussion with Brauchitsch on 22 September, that they be immediately arrested and deposited in concentration camps (Groscurth, 361–2).
52. Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolitzei und des SD 1938–1942, Stuttgart, 1981, 19–106, esp.44ff., 63, 69; Helmut Krausnick, ‘Judenverfolgung’, in Hans Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS- Staates, Olten-Freiburg im Breisgau, 1965, ii.348–9; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14ff., 187; Benz, Graml, and Wei?, Enzyklopadie, 524 (entry on ‘Intelligenzaktion’). The terror against the Polish population was far from confined to the German zone of occupation. After the Soviet Union had occupied the eastern part of Poland on 17 September, the NKVD (Stalin’s secret police, which sustained links at the time with the SS), arrested and deported to the Arctic or Central Asia an estimated 315,000–330,000 Poles, and in the spring of 1940 perpetrated the infamous massacre of thousands of captured Polish officers, later discovered in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk (Norman Davies, Europe. A History, Oxford, 1996, 1002–5 (where the number of 1–2 million deportees is given, following the figures claimed by the Polish exiled government during the war)). The most detailed analysis of the expulsions and closest estimates of the numbers involved is provided by Gunther Haufele, ‘Zwangsumsiedlungen in Polen 1939– 1941. Zum Vergleich sowjetischer und deutscher Besatzungspolitik’, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Gerhard Hirschfeld (eds.), Lager, Zwangs-arbeit, Vertreibung und Deportation. Dimensionen der Massenverbrechen in der Sowjetunion und in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945, Essen, 1999, 515–33, here 526 and 521 for the estimated 11,000 victims of the Katyn ‘executions’.
53. Helmut Krausnick, ‘Hitler und die Morde in Polen’, VfZ, 11 (1963), 196–209, here 196–7.
54. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 483.
55. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 484.
56. Hilarius Breitinger, Als Deutschenseelsorger in Posen und im Warthegau 1934–1945. Erin- nerungen, Mainz, 1984, 30–38; Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 484.
57. Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 12–13; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 50–51. The exiled Polish government in London, citing the report of an Englishwoman who had lived in Bromberg and had been there on the so-called ‘Bloody Sunday’ of 3 September, implied that nothing untoward had happened that day and that it had been purely a German invention (The German New Order in Poland, London, n.d. (1941), 131).
58. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 51.
59. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 51 and 180 n.78 (for the later claim by Hitler’s Army Adjutant Gerhard Engel that the dictator had personally given the order to exaggerate the number of victims); Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 12–13, and n.23. See also Breitinger, 38–42, and, for a detailed examination of the myth launched by German propaganda, Karol Marian Pospieszalski, ‘The Case of the 58,000 “Volksdeutsche”. An Investigation into Nazi Claims Concerning Losses of the German Minority in Poland before and during 1939’, in Documenta Occupationis, ed. Instytut Zachodni, vol.vii, 2nd edn, Poznan, 1981.
60. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 484.
61. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 51.
62. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 486. A full analysis of the role of the ‘Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz’ is provided in the book by the same authors: Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, Der ‘Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz’ in Polen 1939/40, Munich, 1992, especially, for the atrocities perpetrated by the organization, 111–59.
63. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 486.
64. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 487–8; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14.
65. Cit. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 490.
66. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 32.
67. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 491.
68. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 496; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14.
69. Groscurth, 201 (8 September 1939) and n.476, including the recollection that Hitler had made the same complaints as Heydrich on the same day to Keitel.
70. Halder KTB, i.79 (19 September 1939). See Broszat, Polenpolitik, 20, for the first use of ‘Flurbereinigung’ in the notes of Canaris’s talk with Keitel on 12 September.
71. Halder KTB, i.67 (10 September 1939); Groscurth, 203 (11 September 1939).
72. IfZ, Nuremberg Documents, PS-3047, Serie II, Blatt 2, ‘Aktenvermerk uber die Besprechung im Fuhrerzug am 12.9.1939 in Ilnau’; Groscurth, 358; also cit. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 20; Jansen- Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 494.
73. Groscurth, 202 (9 September 1939).
74. IMG, xxvi.255–7, Doc.686-PS; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 22 and 175, n.35.
75. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 21–2; also printed in Kurt Patzold (ed.), Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernich-tung. Dokumente des faschistischen Antisemitismus 1933 bis 1942, Leipzig, 1983, 239–40 (misdated to 27 September); and Europa unterm Hakenkreuz: Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Polen (1939–1945), Dokumentenauswahl und Einleitung von Werner Rohr et al., East Berlin, 1989, 119–20 (and 120–22 for the instructions issued the same day to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen). The SD’s ‘Jewish Department’ II 112 had already begun collecting detailed data early in May on the Jewish population in Poland, building up a card-index which, in the event of its deployment, could be passed on to an Einsatzkommando. (I am most grateful to Professor Dan Michmann, Bar-Ilan, Israel, for passing to me a copy of the relevant document, taken from BA, R 58/954. See also Dan Michmann, ‘Preparing for Occupation? A Nazi Sicherheitsdienst Document of Spring 1939 on the Jews of Holland’, Studia Rosenthaliana, 32 (1998), 173–80, here 177.)
76. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 98–9. Unlike Heydrich, Hitler evidently envisaged the eastern fortifications beyond the General Government, but excluding the area of Jewish settlement. Heydrich depicted it as running along the line of the German provinces.
77. TBJG, I/7, 147 (10 October 1939). Hitler’s contempt for the Poles was, as he told Mussolini several months later, bolstered by his impressions of Poland during the campaign (Andreas Hillgruber (ed.), Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen 1939–1941, Munich, 1969 (= Staatsmanner I) 46–7 (18 March 1940)).
78. Domarus, 1283; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 23.
79. The meeting was apparently occasioned by a complaint by Hans Frank about his military superiors (Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 85).
80. General Governor Frank later, on 30 May 1940, justified the liquidation of a Polish ruling stratum in the notorious ‘AB-Aktion’ — the ‘Au?erordentliche Befriedungsaktion’ (‘Extraordinary Pacification Action’), camouflage for the liquidation of mainly political opponents and criminals in the General Government between May and July 1940 — by recourse to a directive from Hitler (Krausnick,
