167. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 241.
168. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 228.
169. Bert Honolka, Die Kreuzelschreiber. Arzte ohne Gewissen: Euthanasie im Dritten Reich, Hamburg, 1961, 35. Broszat, Staat, 399, suggests only about fifty doctors and technicians knew the full extent of the ‘action’. The German names for the dummy-organizations involved were, respectively: ‘Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft der Heil- und Pflegeanstalten’; ‘Gemeinnutzige Kranken- transportgesellschaft’; and ‘Gemeinnutzige Stiftung fur Anstaltspflege’.
170. Honolka, 37.
171. Honolka, 33.
172. Burleigh/Wippermann, The Racial State, 148.
173. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 95–8, 112–15,192–3; Schmuhl, 240–42; Gotz Aly, ‘Endlosung’. Volkerver-schiebung und der Mord an den europaischen Juden, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, 114–26; Benzenhofer, Der gute Tod?, 118–19.
174. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 244 and n.33; Burleigh/Wippermann, The Racial State, 153.
175. Including the killings which continued in asylums despite the ‘stop decree’, the thousands more later killed in the so-called ‘wild’ euthanasia and the ‘14f13’ programme that continued down to the end of the war, the thousands of ‘euthanasia’ victims who were killed in Poland, the Soviet Union, and other occupied territories, and the children murdered in the ‘Child Euthanasia’ programme (which was not halted by the ‘stop decree’), it is possible to reach estimates as high as a further 90,000 to add to the 70,000 or more of the T4 ‘action’. (Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 345ff.; Burleigh/Wippermann, The Racial State, 144, 148; Benzenhofer, Der gute Tod?, 129.)
176. Above based on Deutsch, 42–67, 81–91, 105–7, Ch.VI; and see Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 419–29.
177. Mommsen, ‘Widerstand’, 9, speaks of ‘a resistance of state servants’ (‘einen Widerstand der Staatsdiener’).
178. Deutsch, 188–9.
179. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 376–402; Kordt, 359–77; Deutsch, 189–253, and Ch.VII; Muller, Heer, Ch.XI.
180. See Peter Hoffmann, ‘Maurice Bavaud’s Attempt to Assassinate Hitler in 1938’, in George L. Mosse, Police Forces in History, Beverly Hills, 1975, 173–204, for the hare-brained schemes of the Swiss student Maurice Bavaud. For Hitler’s security, see Hoffmann, ‘Hitler’s Personal Security’, in the same volume, 151–71, and Peter Hoffmann, Hitler’s Personal Security, London, 1979. Left-wing resistance groups had by this time inevitably dwindled greatly in size since the early years of the regime, when tens of thousands of people had been involved in various forms of illegal activity. A minute fraction of the working class was now involved. Networks of friends and trusted contacts frequently formed the base. (See Detlev J. K. Peukert, ‘Working-Class Resistance: Problems and Options’, in David Clay Large (ed.), Contending with Hitler. Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich, Cambridge, 1991, 35–48, here 41–2; and Martin Broszat, ‘A Social and Historical Typology of the German Opposition to Hitler’, in the same volume, 25–33, here 27–9.) Secretly maintaining such networks of like-minded opponents of the regime, exchanging views, and keeping up morale was often an end in itself for Social Democrats. (William Sheridan Allen, ‘Die sozialdemo-kratische Untergrundbewegung: Zur Kontinuitat der subkulturellen Werte’, in Schmadeke and Steinbach, 849–66, especially 857ff.) For the Communists, a difficult phase, with much disillusionment and disarray at the grass-roots of the underground resistance-movement, had begun with the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August. (Detlev Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand. Verfolgung und Untergrundarbeit an Rhein und Ruhr 1933 bis 1945, Wuppertal, 1980, 329ff.)
181. Weizsacker-Papiere, 164: ‘… ware man der peinlichen Entscheidung uberhoben, wie man denn England militarisch zu Boden zwingen kann’.
182. The sixty-five French divisions available for an assault on Germany from the West in September 1939 had massively outnumbered the Wehrmacht units, which were so heavily committed in Poland. But they were never sent into action. (DRZW, ii.18–19, 270. See also Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategic Politik und Kriegfuhrung 1940–1941, (1965), 3rd edn, Bonn, 1993, 34–5, 53.)
183. See Domarus, 1369–70, for Hitler’s suggestion to the Swedish intermediary Dahlerus on 26 September that he would guarantee security for Britain and France, needed peace to cultivate — a task requiring at least fifty years — the newly-won territories in Poland (a state which would not be allowed to be recreated), and could offer Britain peace within fourteen days without loss of face. As usual, this ‘generosity’ was coupled with threats. He had destroyed Poland within three weeks. The British (Englander) should reflect on what could happen to them within three months. If they wanted a long war, Germany would hold out and reduce England to a heap of rubble. Some of these sentiments were repeated in Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 6 October. (See Domarus, 1388ff.)
184. Irving, HW, 25. The British War Cabinet put out the announcement on 9 September that it expected a three-year war to quell rumours that British action depended upon events in Poland (The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 215 and n).
185. DRZW, ii.240.
186. Below, 210. He had already learned from Schmundt on 8 September that Hitler was intending to attack France as soon as possible. Hitler, according to Below, spoke about this to his closest military advisers on a number of occasions during the following days and was determined to launch the attack in October or November.
187. Halder KTB, i.86–90 (27 September 1939); trans. Halder Diary, 62–6.
188. DRZW, ii.238.
189. Warlimont, 37.
190. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 99 (29 September 1939).
191. Domarus, 1392.
192. Domarus, 1390.
193. Domarus, 1389, 1393.
194. Domarus, 1393.
195. Chamberlain asked who stood in the way of genuine peace in Europe, and answered his own rhetorical question: ‘It is the German Government, and the German Government alone’ (cit. Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 223). All unofficial feelers in the following months met with a similar response.
196. Halder KTB, i. 99 (7 October 1939); Muller, Heer, 475.
197. Halder KTB, i. 100 (9 October 1939); Muller, Heer, 476.
198. Cit. Muller, Heer, 476.
199. Warlimont, 50; Muller, Heer, 476.
200. Halder KTB, i. 101–3 (10 October 1939); Muller, Heer, 476; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940, Gottingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1956, 4–20, Nr.3, S.4ff., here, 15, 19. See also DRZW, ii.239; and Hillgruber, Strategie, 45–6. Hitler remained convinced that he had been correct in his views when he referred to the memorandum in December 1944. (Helmut Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen im Fuhrerhauptquartier. Protokoli’fragmente aus Hitlers militarischen Konferenzen 1942–1945, Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft edn, Berlin/Darmstadt/Vienna, 1963 (=LB Darmstadt), 284.)
201. Halder KTB, i. 101 (10 October 1939).
202. Weisungen, 37–8.
203. Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 268.
204. Halder KTB, i. 107 (16 October 1939, mistakenly dated the following day).
