Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

248. Halder KTB, iii.528 (24 September 1942). Halder was far from pessimistic about overall developments in the war. (See Weizsacker-Papiere, 303 (30 September 1942).)

249. Hartmann, 339.

250. KTB OKW, ii/I, 669 (2 September 1942).

251. Halder KTB, iii.514 (31 August 1942).

252. Halder KTB, iii.521 (11 September 1942); DRZW, vi.982; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 32.

253. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 32–3.

254. Below, 318; Domarus, 1924–5.

255. DRZW, vi.684–7; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 30–31; Irving, HW, 419; Domarus, 1924.

256. See Weinberg III, 351, 355–6, 361–2.

257. Below, 317.

258. TBJG, II/5, 594 (29 September 1942). For a repeat of these remarks and criticism of the behaviour of the Munich population during the raid, TBJG, II/5, 604 (30 September 1942).

259. TBJG, II/5, 358 (20 August 1942).

260. Steinert, 316; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 185.

261. Below, 317; Irving, HW, 427.

262. TBJG, II/5, 370 (20 August 1942). The date appears to have been fixed only late in September (TBJG, II/5, 584 (28 September 1942).

263. TBJG, II/5, 594–5 (29 September 1942). See also 596 for Goebbels’s scepticism; and Domarus, 1912, for the DNB summary of the speech.

264. Below, 318.

265. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, Bd. 1942 (Sept.-Okt.), from NA T78/317/1567ff., Fuhrerrede zum Ausbau des Atlantikwalles am 29.Sept. 1942. See Irving, HW, 428– 9.

266. Domarus, 1913–24.

267. Domarus, 1915; MadR, xi.4259 (1 October 1942).

268. Domarus, 1920.

269. Domarus, 1914, 1916.

270. TBJG, II/6, 42 (2 October 1942).

271. TBJG, II/5, 357 (20 August 1942).

272. TBJG, II/6, 46–7 (2 October 1942); and see also TBJG, II/5, 354 (20 August 1942).

273. TBJG, II/6, 48–9 (2 October 1942).

274. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 33; and see Engel, 129–30 (2–3, 10 October 1942).

275. TBJG, II/5, 356 (20 August 1942).

276. DRZW, vi.987–8; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 33.

277. DRZW, vi.988–93; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 34.

278. Engel, 129 (10 February 1942).

279. DRZW, vi.993–4; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 34.

280. Domarus, 1916.

281. Below, 319; Manfred Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee im Kessel von Stalingrad’, in Forster, Stalingrad, 76–110, here 76–9.

282. Domarus, 1931.

283. Below, 320–21; 1929–30; Irving, HW, 439–42 (who draws the comparison with the fate of Generals Hoepner and Sponeck the previous January).

284. On 1 November Hitler had transferred his headquarters from Vinnitsa back to the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, where his entourage were pleased to find that bright and spacious wooden barracks had been added to the gloomy bunkers to which they had all been earlier confined. He had left his headquarters for Berlin, then Munich, on 6 November (Below, 321).

285. German views on the eastward-bound convoy from Gibraltar varied between seeing it as carrying provisions for Malta or heading for Tripolitania to attack Rommel from the rear. The Italian General Staff more realistically presumed that the objective was the occupation of French bases in North Africa. Mussolini and Ciano expected no resistance from the French (CD, 520 (7 November 1942)).

286. The first American fighting units to be engaged in the north African theatre of war were bombing crews relocated from India to the Egyptian front in the wake of the Tobruk disaster (Weinberg III, 356).

287. Below, 321–2; Engel, 134 (8 November 1942).

288. Below, 321–2.

289. Domarus, 1937.

290. TBJG, II/6, 254 (9 November 1942).

291. TBJG, II/6, 257–9 (9 November 1942).

292. TBJG, II/6, 259 (9 November 1942).

293. Domarus, 1935.

294. Domarus, 1938.

295. Domarus, 1937; Jackel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an den europaischen Juden’, 161.

296. Steinert, 318–19; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 186–9.

297. Engel reported that Hitler’s speech had been the subject of much discussion at Fuhrer Headquarters. He and others, he said, had been ‘disgusted’ that Hitler had spoken so optimistically ‘with his audience in mind (berechnet auf Zuhorerkreis)’ (Engel, 134 (10 November 1942)).

298. TBJG, II/6, 259–60 (9 November 1942).

299. TBJG, II/6, 261, 263 (9 November 1942).

300. TBJG, II/6, 258–9, 261–2 (9 November 1942).

301. CD, 521 (9 November 1942); 522 (10 November 1942).

302. CD, 522 (9 November 1942).

303. CD, 522 (10 November 1942); Schmidt, 576.

304. Domarus, 1945–9.

305. Weisungen, 220–21 (Directive No.42, 29 May 1942).

306. Below, 322–3.

307. Below, 323; DRZW, vi.997; Irving, HW, 455.

308. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 191; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 80–81; DRZW, vi.997–1009, 1018–21; and, fundamental especially for the Soviet side, Erickson, ch.10. There were also more than 30,000 soldiers of other nationalities, 10,000 of them Romanians, encircled (Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 90).

309. Below, 323–4.

310. Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht, Stuttgart, 1974, 163; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 82; DRZW, vi.1024.

311. KTB OKW, ii/I, 84, ii/II, 1006 (22 November 1942); Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 183; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 85; DRZW, vi.1025.

312. Below, 324. Both those close to Hitler and those who later castigated his direction of the war concurred many years after the events that he accepted Goring’s assurances that the troops at Stalingrad could be sustained from the air. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970; 68–1, interview of Otto Gunsche by John Toland, 26 March 1971.) For the dreadful weather conditions in Stalingrad in November, at times dipping to as low as minus eighteen degrees Celsius, see Antony Beevor, Stalingrad, London, 1998, 214, 230, 232.

313. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 219; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’,