Erlebnisse mit Generalfeldmarschall Paulus’, Der Spiegel, 37/1992, 170 — 71.)
369. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 94; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 109.
370. LB Darmstadt, 73 (1 February 1943).
371. LB Darmstadt, 72.
372. LB Darmstadt, 73.
373. LB Darmstadt, 74 and n.84, 79.
374. LB Darmstadt, 77, 79–80. Paulus entered Soviet captivity with the remainder of his troops, and was eventually released in 1953. In 1944 he provided support from Moscow for the ‘National Committee of Free Germany’, the organization initiated by the Soviet leadership and comprising exiled German Communists and prisoners-of-war, which sought — largely in vain — to subvert morale at the front among German troops and to incite resistance to the Nazi regime. Ernst Nolte, Der europaische Burgerkrieg. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, Berlin, 1987, 114–23 (especially 115), 528–9, 564 n.24, 596 n.36, used Hitler’s comments on rats in the Lubljanka prison as part of a speculative hypothesis that his paranoid antisemitism arose out of his acute and lasting horror at Bolshevik atrocities in the years immediately following the Russian Revolution. This assertion was then incorporated in the construction of his heavily criticized interpretation positing Bolshevism, and ‘class genocide’, as the prior agent of a causal nexus leading ultimately to the Nazi ‘race genocide’ against the Jews. (See Ernst Nolte, ‘Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will’, in ‘Historikerstreit’. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernicbtung, 2nd edn, Munich/Zurich, 1987, 39–47.
375. Domarus, 1985.
376. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 192.
377. Nadler, 73, 76.
378. MadR, xii.4720 (28 January 1943), 4750–1 (4 February 1943), 4760–1 (8 February 1943).
379. Goebbels acknowledged that the criticism was now also directed at Hitler (TBJG, II/7, 266 (5 February 1943).
380. Hassell, 347 (14 February 1943).
381. MadR, xii.4720 (28 January 1943).
382. GStA, Munich, MA 106671, report of the Regierungsprasident of Oberbayern, 10 March 1943: ‘Der Stalingrad-Morder’.
383. Hassell, 348–9 (14 February 1943); Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 464ff.; Ritter, 35off.; Hoffmann, 346ff., Joachim Fest, Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli, Berlin, 1994, 199–205.
384. Inge Scholl, Die Wei?e Rose, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, 108; (‘Kommilitonen! Kommilitoninnen! Erschuttert steht unser Volk vor dem Untergang der Manner von Stalingrad. Dreihundertdrei?igtausend deutsche Manner hat die geniale Strategie des Weltkriegsgefreiten sinn- und verantwortungslos in Tod und Verderben gehetzt. Fuhrer, wir danken dir!’); also printed in Hinrich Siefken (ed.), Die Wei?e Rose und ihre Flugblatter, Manchester, 1994, 32. This was the sixth and final broadsheet. The fifth, produced between 13 and 29 January, is printed (wrongly dated to 18 February 1943) alongside other texts related to the ‘White Rose’ in Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), Widerstand in Deutschland 1933–1945. Ein historisches Lesebuch, Munich, 1994, 236–7 (trans, in N & P, iv.457) and reproduced in facsimile in Siefken, Die Wei?e Rose und ihre Flugblatter, 88–9 (see 20–1 for dating). See also J. P. Stern, ‘The White Rose’, in Hinrich Siefken (ed.), Die Wei?e Rose. Student Resistance to National Socialism 1942/43. Forschungsergebnisse und Erfahrungsberichte, Nottingham, n.d. (1991), 11–36.
385. Benz and Pehle, Lexikon, 318–19.
386. See IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.79: Hitler was on the evening of the news of the fall of Stalingrad ‘a tired old man (ein muder alter Herrn)’, and the mood at headquarters reminded her of a visit to a cemetery on a rainy November day. See also Irving, HW, 480. According to Speer, 264, after the capitulation Hitler never referred to Stalingrad again.
387. TBJG, II/7, 171 (23 January 1943).
388. Schroeder, 130; TBJG, II/7, 171 (23 January 1943).
389. See Irving, HW, 480.
390. Below, 326.
391. Below, 329–30.
392. TBJG, II/7, 285 (8 February 1943).
393. TBJG, II/ 7, 293 (8 February 1943).
394. TBJG, II/7, 285–6 (8 February 1943); also 287–8, 293–5.
395. TBJG, II/ 7, 288–9 (8 February 1943).
396. TBJG, II/ 7, 287 (8 February 1943).
397. Below, 327.
398. TBJG, II/ 7, 287 (8 February 1943).
399. TBJG, II/ 7, 291–2 (8 February 1943).
400. TBJG, II/ 7, 290–2, 294 (8 February 1943).
401. TBJG, II/ 7, 295–6 (8 February 1943).
402. TBJG, II/ 7, 295–7, (8 February 1943).
403. TBJG, II/ 7, 292 (8 February 1943).
404. TBJG, II/7, 296 (8 February 1943).
405. The speech had been postponed from 14 March (RGBl, 1 943 I, 137; Domarus, 1998). Hitler indicated at the beginning of his speech (Domarus, 1999) that the postponement had been caused by the crisis on the eastern front. This had — temporarily — been ended by the retaking of Kharkov (which the Red Army had regained in February) on 14–15 March (KTB OKW, ii/2, 209 (14 March 1943), 214–15 (15 March 1943).
406. TBJG, II/7, 593–4, 607, 611 (20 March 1943).
407. TBJG, II/7, 610 (20 March 1943).
408. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 196–7. The figures probably seemed far too low because most people conflated them with the total casualties. In Haider’s last note of casualties on the eastern front before he left office, he gave the total killed for the period between 22 June 1941 and 10 September 1942 as 336,349, and the total losses (killed, wounded, missing) as 1,637,280 (Haider KTB, iii.522 (15 September 1942). The figure for dead provided by Hitler in March 1943 was, therefore, less outlandish than it seemed to his audience. Many presumed Hitler was referring only to dead on the eastern front, not in all theatres of war. But the eastern front in any case accounted for the vast proportion of those killed in action.
409. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 207–10.
