Books edn, London, 1971, 534 — 5.
117. Hilberg, Destruction, 323. For the uprising, see Yisrael Gutman, The Jews of Warsaw 1939–1943. Ghetto, Underground, Revolt, London, 1982, ch.14. The length of time it took to crush the uprising was a reflection, as Gutman shows, of the extent to which the German occupying forces had underestimated the activities and tenacity of the Jewish underground in the ghetto.
118. TBJG, II/8, 104 (14 April 1943).
119. TBJG, II/8, 114–15 (17 April 1943). Hitler let Goebbels know a few days later that he wished to talk with him about the future treatment of the ‘Jewish Question’, of which he had very high hopes (II.8, 165 (25 April 1943)). For Goebbels’s exploitation of Katyn for propaganda purposes, see Bramsted, 330–32; Reuth, Goebbels, 526–7; and David Welch, The Third Reich. Politics and Propaganda, London, 1993, 112–13. Reports of the Katyn massacres by the Bolsheviks had the effect, however, of provoking comment about the killing of the Jews by the Germans. See the entry in the diary of Hassell, 365 (15 May 1943), indicating knowledge of gassing of hundreds of thousands in specially built chambers (Hallen). And see also Steinert, 255; Lawrence D. Stokes, ‘The German People and the Destruction of the European Jews’, Central European History, 6 (1973), 167–91, here 186–7; Bankier, 109; Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 365–7; and Kulka, ‘“Public Opinion”’, 289 (for the telling report from the Gauleitung of Upper Silesia pointing out wall-daubings in the area comparing Katyn and Auschwitz).
120. TBJG, II/8, 235, 237 (and see 229) (8 May 1943). Hitler returned on several occasions to emphasize the vital role to be played by antisemitic propaganda in discussions with Goebbels during the following days (TBJG, II/8, 261 (10 May 1943), 297–90 (13 May 1943)).
121. TBJG, II/8, 105 (14 April 1943), 225 (7 May 1943).
122. TBJG, II/8, 236 (8 May 1943).
123. Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Wolfgang Schumann et al., 6 vols., East Berlin, 1974 — 84, iii.411–13.
124. TBJG, II/8, 236, 238 (8 May 1943).
125. TBJG, II/8, 224 (7 May 1943).
126. TBJG, II/8, 229, 233–40 (8 May 1943).
127. Warlimont, 313; Domarus, 2014; Weinberg III, 446; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 221.
128. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs. Ten Years and Twenty Days, (1958), New York, 1997, 299ff., 342ff.; Thomas, 218, 226–7. On taking office Donitz had, however, changed his mind about scrapping the battleships and was successful in persuading Hitler to retain them (Doenitz, 371ff.; Thomas, 227).
129. TBJG, II/7, 239 (8 May 1943).
130. Lagevortrage, 510 (5 June 1943): ‘Niederschrift uber die Besprechung des Ob.d.M. beim Fuhrer am 31.5.43 auf dem Berghof.’
131. Doenitz, 341; Roskill, ii.470; Thomas, 230–31.
132. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Volume V, Closing the Ring, London etc., 1952, 6–10; Overy, Why the Allies Won, 50–9; Oxford Companion, 68–9, 1168–9.
133. Weinberg III, 594.
134. Warlimont, 317–19.
135. LB Darmstadt, 97–8 (20 May 1943).
136. LB Darmstadt, 100–101.
137. LB Darmstadt, 104–6.
138. Warlimont, 331.
139. TBJG, II/8, 300 (15 May 1943), 314 (17 May 1943), 337 (21 May 1943), 351 (23 May 1943).
140. Below, 339.
141. TBJG, II/8, 492–8 (19 May 1943).
142. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 202–3.
143. TBJG, II/8, 527–8 (25 June 1943). Hitler thought, as he had said before on occasion, that it was not so bad that the inner-cities had been destroyed. Most of the industrial cities had been badly laid out and constructed. The British air-raids gave the opportunity for grandiose rebuilding schemes after the war.
144. TBJG, II/8, 533 (25 June 1943).
145. TBJG, II/8, 291 (13 May 1943).
146. TBJG, II/8, 287 (13 May 1943).
147. TBJG, II/8, 288 (13 May 1943).
148. TBJG, II/8, 288 (13 May 1943).
149. TBJG, II/8, 290 (13 May 1943).
150. The Stroop Report. The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw Is No More. A facsimile edition and translation of the official Nazi report on the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, introd. by Andrzej Wirth, (1960), London, 1980,(unpaginated), entry for 16 May 1943.
151. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 164–71; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 422–8; Irving, HW, 528–9. Hitler expressed on several occasions his dissatisfaction with Frank, and thought of replacing him with Greiser. But, as so often, he took no decision, and ultimately pointed out that Frank’s task in the General Government was so difficult that it was beyond anyone to accomplish. (See TBJG, II/8, 226 (7 May 1943), 251 (9 May 1943), 535 (25 June 1943).)
152. IfZ, MA 316, Frames 2615096 — 8, ‘Vortrag beim Fuhrer am 19.6.1943 auf dem Obersalzberg: “Bandenkampf und Sicherheitslage”’, quotation Frame 2615097; Fleming, Hitler und die Endlos-ung, 33. That the suggestion came from Himmler is supported by the similar wording of his letter to Hans Frank some weeks earlier, on 26 May, when he wrote: ‘The evacuation also of the last 250,000 Jews, which will without doubt provoke unrest for some weeks, must despite all the difficulties be completed as rapidly as possible’ (IfZ, MA 330, Frames 2654157–8, ‘Einladung des Generalgouverneurs an den Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler zu Besprechung’, 26 May 1943; 2654162–3, Antwortschreiben Himmlers, 26 May 1943 (quotation, 2654162: ‘Die Evakuierung auch der letzten 150,000 Juden, die fur Wochen noch ohne Zweifel Unruhe hervorrufen wird, mu? trotz aller Schwierigkeiten so rasch wie moglich vollzogen werden’).
153. Schirach, 288; TBJG, II/8, 265 (10 May 1943), 458 (II June 1943).
154. Schirach, 289.
155. Schirach, 290–91.
156. Schirach, 291–2.
157. Schirach, 292–4; also Monologe, 403–6, for a watered-down version; TBJG, II/8, 538–41 (25 June 1943), describing Frau von Schirach as behaving like a ‘silly goose (dumme Pute)’; Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 190– 91; Below, 340 (who does not mention the incident with the Jewish women); Henriette von Schirach, DerPreis der Herrlichkeit. Erlebte Zeitgeschichte, (1956), Munich/Berlin, 1975, 8–10.
158. Guderian, 310.
159. Guderian, 3II.
160. Warlimont, 333–4.
161. TBJG, II/8, 531–2 (25 June 1943).
162. Domarus, 2021; see also Irving, HW, 532–3.
163. Below, 340.
164. See LB Stuttgart, 269–75, 297_8, 309–12, 338–40, 364–8 (midday and evening briefings, 25 July 1943), where it is apparent that tank production figures were lower than those Hitler had expected; Guderian, 306–9; Manstein, 448–9; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: the
