German Defeat in the East, Washington, 1968,130–32,135–73; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, 86, 97ff., 135; Ernst Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation ‘Zitadelle’ 1943, Stuttgart, 1966, 140–44, 196; Weinberg III, 601–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 239; Overy, Why the Allies Won, 86–97; Overy, Russia’s War, ch.7, especially 203–12; Glantz and House, 166–7; Irving, HW, 533. Accounts of the battle give differing numbers of tanks involved. Ziemke, 101, has 4,000 Soviet and 3,000 German tanks. DZW, iii.545, numbers the Soviet tanks at 2,700; see also Erickson, Road to Berlin, 144–5; and Klink, 205.
165. Guderian, 311; and see Manstein, 448.
166. Below, 341; Manstein, 448 — 9; Weinberg III, 603.
167. Guderian, 312.
168. Warlimont, 334.
169. Below, 341; Warlimont, 335–8; Weinberg III, 594; Irving, HW, 534–5; Oxford Companion, 1001–3. Looking back in 1944, Mussolini himself remarked on the poor morale of the Italian troops in Sicily prior to the Allied landing (Benito Mussolini, My Rise and Fall, (1948), New York, 1998, two vols, in one, ii.25.
170. Warlimont, 336–7.
171. Staatsmanner II, 287–300; Baur, 1ch flog Machtige der Erde, 245–6; Warlimont, 339.
172. Based on: Staatsmanner II, 286–300; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler- Dokumentation (1943), extracts from Mussolini’s diary, Auswartiges Amt, Serial 715/263729–32, 263755–8 (in Italian, and in German translation); Mussolini, ii.49–51; Irving, HW, 541–2; Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, Paladin edn, London, 1985, 341–2; Warlimont, 339–40; Schmidt, 340; Domarus, 2022–3-
173. IfZ, MA 460, Frames 2567178–81. Himmler was informed on 19 July and cabled Bormann without delay. See also Irving, HW, 543; and Meir Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews. German Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy 1922–1945, Oxford, 1978, 339–40.
174. LB Darmstadt, 148 and n.207 (25 July 1943); TBJG, II/9, 157 (25 July 1943); Below, 342.
175. Mussolini, ii.55–67; Mack Smith, 342–5; Domarus, 2023 and n.250. See also Hans Woller, Die Abrechnung mit dem Faschismus in Italien 1943 bis 1948, Munich, 1996, 9–35.
176. Mussolini, ii.68–81; Mack Smith, 346–9.
177. LB Darmstadt, 148–9. The extremist Roberto Farinacci was only one of the forces behind calling the Council meeting. The faction around the more moderate Dino Grandi intended to use the meeting to pave the way for ending Italy’s involvement in the war, (See LB Darmstadt, 148 n.207 (25 July 1943); Mack Smith, 344.)
178. LB Darmstadt, 153 (25 July 1943).
179. LB Darmstadt, 156–7, 160.
180. LB Darmstadt, 149–50, 158.
181. LB Darmstadt, 160.
182. LB Darmstadt, 159–61.
183. TBJG, II/9, 166 (26 July 1943).
184. TBJG, II/ 9, 169 (27 July 1943).
185. LB Darmstadt, 168–70 (26 July 1943).
186. TBJG, II/9, 169 (27 July 1943).
187. LB Darmstadt, 171 (26 July 1943).
188. TBJG, II/9, 174 (27 July 1943).
189. MadR, xiv, 5560–2 (2 August 1943).
190. TBJG, II/9, 169–74 (27 July 1943)-
191. LB Darmstadt, 173–96 (26 July 1943).
192. LB Darmstadt, 206 (26 July 1943).
193. TBJG, II/ 9, 177 (27 July 1943), 185 (28 July 1943).
194. TBJG, II/ 9, 179–80 (27 July 1943).
195. TBJG, II/9, 185 (27 July 1943).
196. Warlimont, 373.
197. Warlimont, 373; Irving, HW, 550.
198. Domarus, 2026. ‘The Will to Power’ (‘Der Wille zur Macht’) was the title of the work -intended as a systematic statement of his philosophy — which was left unfinished at Nietzsche’s death.
199. LB Darmstadt, 133 n.179; Broszat-Frei, 278; Weinberg III, 616; Churchill, v.459–60; Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces against a German City in 1943, New York, 1981, 252ff. (for reports from citizens of Hamburg), 322ft for an assessment of the raid. For popular opinion and the difficulties facing the propaganda machine, see Gerald Kirwin, ‘Allied Bombing and Nazi Domestic Propaganda’, European History Quarterly, 15 (1985), 341–62, here 350– 51.
200. LB Darmstadt, 136 (25 July 1943).
201. MadR, xiv.5562–3 (2 August 1943).
202. Speer, 296.
203. TBJG, II/9, Z05–6 (2 August 1943).
204. TBJG, II/9, 229 (6 August 1943).
205. Warlimont, 375–7, 379; Oxford Companion, 1001, 1003.
206. In fact, having rejected Kesselring because of his lack of reputation, compared with that of Rommel, Hitler eventually came, in the autumn, to prefer the optimism of the former and give him overall command in Italy (LB Darmstadt, 186 (26 July 1943) and n.258; Warlimont, 386).
207. Warlimont, 374–8; Irving, HW, 554–5, 559–60.
208. TBJG, II/8, 535 (25 June 1943).
209. Himmler had seen Hitler or Bormann with unusual frequency from the day after the fall of Mussolini until his appointment as Reich Minister of the Interior. Hitler had decided upon the appointment at the latest by 16 August, when Lammers began drawing up the necessary documents for a change of minister. Though for months Frick’s fall had seemed predestined — prevented only by Hitler’s notorious unwillingness for prestige reasons to make changes in personnel in the leading echelons of the regime — Himmler’s appointment was plainly an improvised reaction to the potential internal threat in Germany in the wake of the crisis in Italy. Goebbels and Bormann had both harboured pretensions to succeed Frick. Evidently, the determining factor in favour of Himmler was not administrative — he made few changes in this sphere — but control over the instruments of repression. (For the circumstances of Himmler’s appointment, see especially Birgit Schulze, ‘Himmler als Reichsinnenminister’, unpubl. Magisterarbeit, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, 1981, 16–23; also Rebentisch, 499–500; Jane Caplan, Government without Administration. State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany, Oxford, 1988, 318–19; Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich. Untersuchungen zum Verhaltnis von NSDAP und allgemeiner innerer Staatsverwaltung, Munich, 2nd edn, 1971, 196–7.
210. Domarus, 2028–9.
211. TBJG, II/9, 458 (10 September 1943); Irving, HW, 561.
212. Manstein, 458–67; Below, 346; Domarus, 2029, 2032–3; Irving, HW, 562– 3.
213. Below, 346; TBJG, II/9, 449–50 (9 September 1943), 457 (10 September 1943)).
214. Goebbels was telephoned by Hitler before 7p.m., within an hour of the BBC broadcasting the news of
