14. Speer Papers, AH/Schl., Bl.2, for Speer’s view of Hitler as a ‘demonic phenomenon (in seiner damonischen Erscheinung)’, and one of the ‘eternally inexplicable historical natural phenomena (eines dieser immer unerklarlichen geschichtlichen Naturereignisse)’.
15. After the first weeks of the year at the Wolf’s Lair, he repaired to the Berghof, where he stayed, with no more than a day or two’s absence, until he left his alpine retreat for the last time on 14 July 1944. He then returned to the Wolf’s Lair until his final departure from there on 20 November. After staying for three weeks in Berlin, he moved on 10 December to his field headquarters in the West, the Adlerhorst (Eagle’s Nest), which had been constructed in 1939–40 at Ziegenberg, near Bad Nauheim, where he oversaw the Ardennes offensive and remained until January 1945 (Hauner, Hitler, 187–95; Das Gro?e Lexikon des Zweiten Weltkriegs, ed. Christian Zentner and Friedemann Bedurftig, Munich, 1988, 13, 204).
16. Hitler, who had announced his intention of giving the speech only two days earlier, was, according to Goebbels, in good form. The Propaganda Minister thought he would persuade Hitler to allow a broadcast version of the speech, but evidently did not succeed in this (TBJG, II/11, 332, 347–8 (23 February 1944, 25 February 1944)). Nor was there a report, or even an announcement of the speech, in the VB (Tb Reuth, v.1994, n.38). But Domarus, 2088–9, was mistaken in thinking that Hitler had let the entire event drop that year.
17. GStA Munich, MA 106695, report of the Regierungsprasident of Oberbayern, 7 August 1944: ‘Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein Scbrecken ohne Ende!’
18. These were, for example, Jodl’s sentiments when he addressed a gathering of Gauleiter in February in Munich (TBJG, II/n, 345 — 6 (25 February 1944)). Goebbels followed in like vein at a meeting of Propaganda Leaders in Berlin a few days later (Tb Reuth, v. 1996, n.41).
19. Below, 357.
20. Below, 352.
21. Below, 357.
22. ‘Freies Deutschland’, established in September 1943, blended together the organizations ‘Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland”’ (NKFD), which had been set up in July 1943 by the Soviet leadership and comprised largely German Communist emigres and prisoners-of-war, and the ‘Bund Deutscher Offiziere’ (Federation of German Officers), headed by General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach (one of the Sixth Army’s senior commanders who had been captured with Paulus at Stalingrad). (Benz, Graml, and Wei?, Enzyklopddie, 408, 596–7.)
23. See Waldemar Besson, ‘Zur Geschichte des nationalsozialistischen Fuhrungsoffiziers (NSFO)’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 76–116; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Adolf Hitler und der NS-Fuhrungsoffizier (NSFO)’, VfZ, 12 (1964), 443–56; Volker R. Berghahn, ‘NSDAP und “geistige Fuhrung” der Wehrmacht 1939 — 1943’, VfZ, 17 (1969), 17 — 71; and Messerschmidt, 441ff. For Hitler’s order of 22 December 1943, see Besson, 94; and for the response in the army, Below, 356. The mandate to create a corps of National Socialist Leadership Officers was given to General Hermann Reinecke. Their task was to spread commitment to the National Socialist ideology through lectures and indoctrination. By the end of 1944, there were around 1,100 full-time and 47,000 part-time ‘Leadership Officers’, most of them in the reserve. (Benz, Graml, and Wei?, Enzyklopadie, 608.)
24. Manstein, 500 — 503, quotation 503; Domarus, 2076 — 7.
25. Manstein, 504.
26. Manstein, 505; Domarus, 2077.
27. Guderian, 326 — 7, quotation 327.
28. Irving, Doctor, 126, mentions around 105 generals as present on the basis of Morell’s diary.
29. IfZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Fuhrers an die Feldmarschalle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 56 — 7 (for new U-Boats); quotation, 63 (‘… da? niemals auch nur der leiseste Gedanke einer Kapitulation kommen kann, ganz gleich, was auch geschehen moge). Irving, HW, 598; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation (1944), extract from Nachla? von Salmuth (undated, but from 27 March 1946, according to Irving, HW, 881); cold atmosphere: Manstein, 511; TBJG, II/11, 368 (29 February 1944), report to Goebbels by Schmundt.
30. IfZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Fuhrers an die Feldmarschlle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 48 (‘In der letzten Konsequenz mu?te ich, wenn ich als oberster Fuhrer jemals verlassen sein wurde, als Letztes um mich das gesamte Offizierkorps haben, das mu?te dann mit gezogenem Degen um mich geschart stehen…’; differing (inaccurate) wording in Manstein, 511, and Domarus, 2080 (based on Linge), and in Traudl Junge, unpubl. memoirs, IfZ, ED TOO, Irving-Sammlung, Fol. 106.
31. IfZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Fuhrers an die Feldmarschalle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 49 (‘So wird es auch sein, mein Fuhrer!’); Manstein, 511 (with slightly different wording, both of Hitler’s remark and his own interjection).
32. IFZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Fuhrers an die Feldmarschalle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 49 (‘Das ist schon! Wenn das so sein wird, dann werden wir diesen Krieg nie verlieren konnen — niemals, da kann sein, was sein will. Denn die Nation wird dann mit der Kraft in den Krieg gehen, die notwendig ist. Ich nehme das sehr gern zur Kenntnis, Feldmarschall vonManstein!’). Manstein, 512, inaccurately quotes Hitler’s words, and states that Hitler then somewhat abruptly concluded his speech. In fact almost a fifth of the speech was still to come at this point.
33. On hearing of the incident, Goebbels was not inclined to take it seriously (TBJG, II/11, 249 (6 February 1944)). He altered his view some weeks later after Schmundt had described what had happened, referring then to Manstein’s ‘stupid interjection’ (bioder Zwischenruf), made ‘in rather provocative fashion (in ziemlich provozierender Form)’. Schmundt recalled that the meeting had taken place in a glacial atmosphere (in einer eisigen Kuhle). Goebbels noted that Hitler’s relationship with his generals was ‘somewhat poisoned (etwas vergiftet)’ (TBJG, II/11, 368 (29 February 1944)).
34. Manstein, 512.
35. Below, 360.
36. Manstein, 510–11.
37. Manstein, 512.
38. See Irving, HW, 881 note, from Schmundt’s diary, where the interruption and tension of late were noted in connection with Manstein’s retirement.
39. TBJG, II/11, 205–6, 208 (31 January 1944).
40. Domarus, 2082–6.
41. TBJG, II/11, 273–4 (10 February 1944).
42. MadR, 16, 6299 (4 February 1944).
43. On 21 December 1943, Hitler had made Goebbels head of the newly-founded Reichsinspektion der zivilen Luftkriegsma?nahmen (Reich Inspectorate of Civilian Air-War Measures) (Moll, 380).
44. TBJG, II/11, 401 (4 March 1944).
45. TBJG, II/11, 402 (4 March 1944).
46. TBJG, II/2, 406–7 (6 June 1944).
47. Speer, 372; Irving, HW, 531.
48. Below, 363–4.
49. TBJG, II/12, 354–5 (24 May 1944).
50. Speer, 374–8, quotation 377.
51. TBJG, II/11, 247 (6 February 1944).
52. Speer, 378; Heinz Dieter Holsken, Die V-Waffen. Entstehung-Propaganda- Kriegseinsatz, Stuttgart, 1984, 142.
53. Irving, HW, 609.
54. TBJG, II/11, 247 (6 February 1944). Jodl told the Gauleiter later that month
