Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

Goebbels, 518ff.; Irving, Goebbels, 421ff. Fetscher, pt.II, offers a thorough analysis of the reception of the speech abroad.

2. Boelcke, Wollt 1hr, 445–6. See also, for the aims of the speech, Fetscher, 107– 8.

3. Boelcke, Wollt 1hr, 25.

4. For conflicting interpretations, see Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 310 — 14; and Irving, HW, 421, 659 n.II.

5. TBJG, II/7, 373 (19 February 1943).

6. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 311, 313–14; TBJG, II/7, 508 (9 March 1943).

7. See Mason, Sozialpolitik, ch.1. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 305, refers to Goring’s opposition to ‘total war’ measures in 1942.

8. See Stephen Salter, ‘The Mobilisation of German Labour, 1939–1945. A Contribution to the History of the Working Class in the Third Reich’, unpubl. D.Phil, thesis, Oxford, 1983, 29–38, 48–56, 73–4, emphasizing the concern to avoid damage to morale and political tension on the home front; and Dorte Winkler, ‘Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie. Probleme der weiblichen Erwerbstatigkeit in Deutschland 1930–1945’, Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, 17 (1977), 99–126, here 116–20, acknowledging the morale question but stressing the decisive role of Hitler’s ideological objections.

9. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 306–7.

10. On the rival power-blocs of Sauckel and Speer, contesting control of labour deployment, see Walter Naasner, Neue Machtzentren in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1942–1945, Boppard am Rhein, 1994, pts.1 — 2.

11. TBJG, II/7, 561 (16 March 1943).

12. He was empowered to issue directives but not binding decrees, and Hitler reserved to himself the right to decide where objections were raised to Goebbels’s directives (Rebentisch, 516 — 17).

13. TBJG, II/8, 521 (24 June 1943).

14. TBJG, II/8, 265 (10 May 1943).

15. Speer, 315. In fact, Hitler seemed remarkably cool and businesslike rather than outwardly friendly towards Eva Braun in overheard telephone conversations in the Wolfsschanze (Schulz, 90–91).

16. Schroeder, 130.

17. TBJG, II/8, 265 (10 May 1943).

18. Speer, 259.

19. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 312; Hauner, Hitler, 1 81–7; Domarus, 1999– 2002 (21 March 1943), 2050–9 (8 November 1943).

20. Hauner, Hitler, 18 1–7.

21. TBJG, II/9, 160 (25 July 1943).

22. Rebentisch, 463.

23. Monologe, 221–2 (24 January 1942); Rebentisch, 466 and n.295.

24. Rebentisch, 466–70.

25. Rebentisch, 470–72.

26. Rebentisch, 473 and n.318. Vast rebuilding projects for Berlin and Linz were among the other fantasy- schemes Hitler had in mind.

27. Rebentisch, 475.

28. Rebentisch, 477.

29. Steinert, 356.

30. Speer, 234–5.

31. See Dorte Winkler, Frauenarbeit im Dritten Reich, Hamburg, 1977,114–21, for Hitler’s attitude to the Women’s Service Duty (Frauendienstpflicht).

32. IMG, xxv.61, 63–4, Doc. 016-PS (Sauckel’s statement of 20 April 1942).

33. See, for the figures, Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch III. Materialien zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1914–1945, ed. Dietmar Petzina, Werner Abelshauser, and Anselm Faust, Munich, 1978, 85. By 1944, foreign workers would account for 26.5 per cent of the total labour force in Germany, and no less than 46.5 per cent of those working in agriculture (Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 270).

34. Rebentisch, 478.

35. Moll, 311–13; Michalka, Das Dritte Reich, ii.294–5 (Doc.169). For the impact of the decree, see especially Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1982, 207–31.

36. Salter, ‘Mobilisation’, 76–81; Stephen Salter, ‘Class Harmony or Class Conflict? The Industrial Working Class and the National Socialist Regime 1933–1945’, in Jeremy Noakes (ed.), Government, Party, and People in Nazi Germany, Exeter, 1980,76–97, here 90–91; Winkler, ‘Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie’, 118–20.

37. Rebentisch, 478.

38. Rebentisch, 479.

39. Speer, 265.

40. Speer, 266; Rebentisch, 480.

41. Speer, 268; Rebentisch, 479 and n.332.

42. See Rebentisch, 481ff.

43. Speer, 270–71.

44. TBJG, II/7, 444–5 (1 March 1943); Speer, 272.

45. TBJG, II/7, 450 (2 March 1943).

46. TBJG, II/7, 452 (2 March 1943).

47. TBJG, II/7, 452–3 (2 March 1943).

48. Speer, 270–71.

49. TBJG, II/7, 452 (2 March 1943).

50. TBJG, II/7, 454 (2 March 1943).

51. TBJG, II/7, 454 (2 March 1943).

52. TBJG, II/7, 456 (2 March 1943). A withering critique — with negligible results — of the Party and the urgency of its reform had been compiled in 1942 by either Gauleiter Carl Rover, or (more probably) his successor as Gauleiter of Weser-Ems, Paul Wegener. (See Peterson, 25–6; and Orlow, ii.352– 5.)

53. TBJG, II/7, 456–7 (2 March 1943).

54. TBJG, II/7, 456–8 (2 March 1943); Speer, 273, 275.

55. Speer, 271.

56. TBJG, II/8, 98 (12 April 1943).

57. TBJG, II/8, 521 (24 June 1943).

58. TBJG, II/7, 456 (2 March 1943).

59. Speer, 271 and 553 n.5.

60. Rebentisch, 460, 498. Bormann’s influence was indeed great, and growing. Above all, his proximity to Hitler and control of the access of others (with important exceptions) to the Fuhrer, in addition to his leadership of the Party, gave him his unique position of power. But in 1943, Lammers was able for the most part to hold his own, and come to a working arrangement with Bormann, in matters relating to the state administration. Later, his own access to Hitler was increasingly circumscribed by Bormann, whose power was at its peak in the final phase of the Third Reich (Rebentisch, 459–63, 531). Even then, however, Bormann had no independent power, but remained, as Lammers put it, ‘a true interpreter of Adolf Hitler’s directives’ (cit. Rebentisch, 83, n.182 (and see also 498)).

61. Speer, 274; TBJG, II/7, 501–2 (9 March 1943).

62. TBJG, II/7, 503 (9 March 1943); Speer, 275.

63. TBJG, II/7, 505–6, 512 (9 March 1943).

64. TBJG, II/7, 507 (9 March 1943).