86; DRZW, vi. 1025–6; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, 192.
314. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 220; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 87; DRZW, vi.1028–9.
315. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 192.
316. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 224; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 87–8; Manstein, 315; DRZW, vi.1032. Manstein’s own post-war account of Stalingrad (Manstein, 289–366) showed, naturally enough, his own actions in the best possible light. Hitler (almost exclusively), though to some extent Goring (for his unrealistic claims to relieve Stalingrad by air), and Paulus (for errors in not attempting to break out while there was still time) were held responsible for the debacle. While Hitler’s disastrous leadership and overriding culpability are undeniable, it was accepted by a strong critic of Hitler’s direction of the war, former Army Operations Chief Adolf Heusinger, long after the war, that Manstein had to share some of the blame for the catastrophe. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970.) See also the critical assessments by Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel (eds.), Stalingrad. Memories and Reassessments, (1962), London, 1997, 148–78; Beevor, 308–10; and, especially, DRZW, vi.1060–3. Less critical of Manstein is Geoffrey Jukes, Hitler’s Stalingrad Decisions, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1985, 106–47, where, however, Hitler’s disastrous role is portrayed within an increasingly overloaded process of decision-making, not just on the Stalingrad front.
317. Manstein, 316; DRZW, vi.1033.
318. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 386ff.; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 97–8; DRZW, vi.1033–4.
319. Below, 324; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 192–3. For Hoth’s attempt, DRZW, vi.1035ff.
320. According to KTB OKW, ii/2, 1168 (21 December 1942), Manstein had stated at the briefing that the 6th Army could advance a maximum of 30 kilometres; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 99; Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 334; DRZW, vi.1048.
321. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 406–7; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 99–100.
322. KTB OKW, ii/2, 1168 (21 December 1942).
323. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 407; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 100; DRZW, vi.1048.
324. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 410; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 100; DRZW, vi. 1048–9.
325. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 93.
326. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 431–2; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 101.
327. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 93.
328. Below, 324.
329. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 102; Manstein, 373.
330. Weinberg III, 441; Below, 329.
331. Irving, Goring, 372–3.
332. Weinberg III, 434, 436.
333. Irving, Goring, 373.
334. See The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, London, 1953, 368–9.
335. Staatsmanner II, 160–81 (18 December 1942), 190–6 (19 December 1942, 20 December 1942), here especially 165, 168–70, 195 (‘kriegsentscheidend’).
336. CD, 536 (18 December 1942).
337. CD, 535 (18 December 1942); Staatsmanner II, 169–70 (18 December 1942).
338. Staatsmanner II, 192 (19 December 1942).
339. William Craig, Enemy at the Gates. The Battle for Stalingrad, London, 1973, 295–6; Beevor, 313.
340. Craig, 293.
341. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 191; Buchbender/Sterz, 99. For graphic accounts of the terrible conditions of the doomed army in its last weeks, see Beevor, especially ch. 19–22; and Craig, 259– 381.
342. Buchbender/Sterz, 102. Goebbels’s plans for an edition of last letters from soldiers at Stalingrad had to be abandoned when it transpired that most of them contained sentiments far from the heroic tone required. (Steinert, 328. See Letzte Briefe aus Stalingrad, Frankfurt am Main/Heidelberg, 1950, 5–6 (pointing out that only 2 per cent of the letters were favourably disposed towards the leadership of the war)).
343. Letzte Briefe, 21.
344. Letzte Briefe, 1 4.
345. Letzte Briefe, 25.
346. Letzte Briefe, 1 6–17.
347. Below, 326.
348. Below, 325–7.
349. The above based on Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 104–6; Below, 327; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 94; DRZW, vi.1056–7.
350. Boelcke, Wollt ihr, 422.
351. Boelcke, Wollt ihr, 425–6; Steinert, 327. For Goebbels’s pressure for a reorientation of press and OKW propaganda, see TBJG, II/7, 164, 180 (23 January 1943).
352. TBJG, II/7, 1 62, (23 January 1943).
353. TBJG, II/7, 169, 173 (23 January 1943).
354. TBJG, II/7, 162, 168–9 (23 January 1943).
355. TBJG, II/7, 166 (23 January 1943).
356. TBJG, II/7, 1 62, 168 (23 January 1943).
357. TBJG, II/7, 162–3, 171–2 (23 January 1943).
358. TBJG, II/7, 175 (23 January 1943).
359. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 107; DRZW, vi.1057–8.
360. Domarus, 1974.
361. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 531; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 108; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 94; DRZW, vi.1059– 60.
362. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 108.
363. Domarus, 1975.
364. This had been arranged at Goebbels’s visit to FHQ on 22 January (TBJG, II/7,173 (23 January 1943); the text is in Domarus, 1976–80).
365. Domarus, 1979.
366. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 108.
367. Domarus, 1981.
368. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 109. The splitting of the two pockets in Stalingrad, completed on 26 January, had led to a break in communications between them from the following day. Paulus commanded the larger, southern pocket (LB Darmstadt, 72 n.76). According to Lew Besymenski, who acted as interpreter at Paulus’s first interrogation after capture, the newly elevated field-marshal insisted on recognition of his new rank, denied that he had surrendered (claiming he had been ‘surprised’ by his assailants, although he had engaged in lengthy prior negotiations), and refused to sanction the capitulation of his men (despite his own surrender) as ‘unworthy of a soldier’. (‘“Nein, nein, das ist nicht mehr meine Pflicht”. Lew Besymenski uber Stalingrad und seine
