192. Guderian, 367.
193. Weinberg III, 714.
194. Weinberg III, 714–15.
195. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 274–5; Weinberg III, 716–17; DZW, vi.90–95.
196. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 290–307; Weinberg III, 712; DZW, vi.86–90.
197. Weinberg III, 715.
198. TBJG, II/13, 204 (3 August 1944).
199. Domarus, 2142–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 258.
200. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 258–9.
201. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 254–6; Weinberg III, 710–11.
202. Guderian, 355.
203. Himmler’s speech to Wehrkreis Commanders of 21 September 1944, in Smith/Petersen, Himmler. Geheimreden, 246; trans. (slightly amended), Padfield, Himmler, 524. In the handwritten notes he made for his speech to Wehrkreis commanders in Jagerhohe on 21 September 1944, Himmler jotted: ‘General Bor in Warsaw rejects surrender. Then the population dies with him.’ (‘General Bor in Warschau lehnt Ubergabe ab, dann stirbt Bevolkerung mit.’) (IfZ, MA 315, frames 2584103ff. (quotation, frame 2584105).)
204. Himmler stated this in his address to the Wehrkreis commanders on 21 September (see Padfield, Himmler, 524). For the order to raze Warsaw by Hitler on 11 October, see IMG, xii.88, cit. Dok. USSR-128 (=PS-3305); also Padfield, Himmler, 524–5; and Guderian, 358.
205. Guderian, 356; Hohne, Death’s Head, 502; Padfield, Himmler, 524–5; Benz, Graml, and Wei?, Enzyklopadie, 440, 539, for the Dirlewanger and Kaminski units. See also, Hellmuth Auerbach, ‘Konzentrationslagerhaftlinge im Fronteinsatz’, in Benz, Miscellanea. Festschrift fur Helmut Krausnick, 63–83, here especially 66–7.
206. Padfield, Himmler, 527; DZW, vi.61. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 257, has lower figures for both Polish and German losses.
207. IMG, xii.88; Guderian, 358.
208. Schenck, 148; Irving, Doctor, 160; also Redlich, 207.
209. Schenck, 337–8, 342–3.
210. Schenck, 329, 333–6; Irving, Doctor, 161–2, 252–6; Redlich, 224–5, 368–9. Schenck, 336–7. dismisses suggestions that Hitler might have at any point suffered a heart attack, as has sometimes been claimed (e.g. in Hauner, Hitler, 193, and Toland, 822).
211. Schenck, 148. Below, 389, attributed Hitler’s physical collapse to the news that Himmler had just given him of the involvement by Canaris, Goerdeler, Oster, Dohnanyi, and Beck in plotting against him as early as 1938–9. But Himmler gave that information to Hitler on 26 September, as Below notes (see also Irving, HW, 710–11); Hitler’s severe stomach spasms had begun in the night of 23–4 September, as Morell’s diary indicates. For Hitler’s ‘agitation’ over Arnhem and the failure of the Luftwaffe, see Irving, HW, 706–8.
212. Irving, Doctor, 163; Irving, HW, 712; Below, 389.
213. Schenck, 148–9; Irving, Doctor, 164; Irving, HW, 712; Redlich, 207.
214. Schenck, 44, 150–3; Irving, Doctor, 164–8, 172–3.
215. Irving, Doctor, 169–79; Redlich, 209.
216. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 161.
217. See Redlich, 244–52 for a balanced assessment of Morell. Far more critical is Schenck, 287–8.
218. Redlich, 237–44. Schenck, 196–215, assesses the numerous medicines given to Hitler. See also Irving, Doctor, 259–70. Leonard L. Heston and Renate Heston, The Medical Casebook of Adolf Hitler, London, 1979, build up an implausible theory of Hitler’s dependency upon amphetamines as the basis of his irrationality. (See Redlich, 240–42 for a critique.)
219. See Redlich, 233; and Schenck, 325ff. and Redlich, 224–5 for cardiovascular problems.
220. Redlich, 332–41.
221. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens. Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgesprache 1941–1945, Berlin, 1986, 265ff; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 404–5; and Martin, Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 195ff.
222. IMG, xvi.533 (Speer’s testimony of 20 June 1946); Boyd, 158–9; Irving, HW, 891 (note to 699). It is unclear why Weinberg III, 720, thinks ‘there is some evidence that in the fall of 1944 Hitler for the first time seriously considered a possibility he had hitherto always dismissed out of hand’.
223. TBJG, II/13, 524 (20 September 1944).
224. TBJG, II/13, 52.4–5 (20 September 1944). Word of Oshima’s proposal had evidently by this time spread further than Goebbels’s own ministry. The following day, Goebbels castigated in his diary entry a speech, held in private to a select audience, by Labour Front leader Robert Ley which reported on the Oshima initiative and indicated that peace with Moscow was to be expected in the near future (TBJG, II/13, 535 (21 September 1944)).
225. TBJG. II/13, 536–42 (23 September 1944). The rest of his letter was an attack on Ribbentrop, his old adversary, as the man least likely to be capable of bringing about the skilful manoeuvre needed, and a disclaimer that he himself had any ambitions other than to serve Hitler, whose genius in successfully guiding this ‘greatest war in our history’ to victory and securing a happy future for the German people he did not doubt for a second.
226. TBJG, II/13, 556 (24 September 1944), 562 (25 September 1944); TBJG II/14, 83–4 (12 October 1944).
227. See Irving, HW, 689.
228. Below, 390; Guderian, 364.
229. Speer, 423.
230. Below, 390.
231. Below, 386–7.
232. Speer, 417–19. And see Kirwin, ‘Waiting for Retaliation’, for the expectations.
233. Speer, 377. Even this would have carried an explosive load of less than half that of a single combined British and American bombing sortie towards the end of the war (Speer, 572, n.9).
234. Speer, 378.
235. Below, 390.
236. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 284–5; DZW, vi.176.
237. Speer, 239–43; Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power 1939–1945). Cambridge, 1989, 77–8 and ch.4, especially 136–7, and 155; Mark Walker, ‘Legenden um die deutsche Atombombe’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 45–74, here 53; Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker (eds.), Science, Technology, and National Socialism, Cambridge, 1994, 2; Kristie Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany, New York/Oxford, 1993, 173–4, 244 n.41.
238. LB Darmstadt, 245.
239. Speer, 415–17.
240. Speer, 578 n.21.
241. Speer, 414.
