242. Speer, 414–15.
243. Irving, Doctor, 166.
244. TBJG, II/14, 117 (29 October 1944).
245. Speer, 423.
246. Speer, 413.
247. Domarus, 2141 (in response to Papen’s offer to take soundings via Spain).
248. Speer, 423.
249. TBJG, II/13, 208, 210 (3 August 1944). See also his negative comments about Rommel on 31 August in LB Darmstadt, 273–5.
250. Keitel, 332; Domarus, 2155; Speidel, Invasion, 1 78ff.; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 651–2; Fest, Staatsstreich, 313–14.
251. Domarus, 2157.
252. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 275–6 (and see Irving, HW, 722–3).
253. Skorzeny, 126, 130, 132, 134.
254. Skorzeny, 134–5.
255. Skorzeny, 133–5.
256. Skorzeny, 136–8.
257. See Skorzeny, 138ff.; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 275–8; Irving, HW, 719–24; DZW, vi.531–2; Hilberg, Destruction, 552–4.
258. Hilberg, Destruction, 546.
259. Hilberg, Destruction, 552.
260. Hilberg, Destruction, 553 and n.1035.
261. Hilberg, Vernichtung, ii.925–6.
262. Skorzeny, 146.
263. IfZ, F29, diary of General Werner Kreipe, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, Fol.21. See also Guderian, 370–71; Irving, HW, 705. Guderian’s warnings that an offensive in the west would seriously weaken the defences in the east would all too soon prove prophetic. (See Weinberg III, 770.)
264. TBJG, II/13, 498, 500–501 (17 September 1944). See also Irving, HW, 706.
265. Warlimont, 478. For the varying views of Goebbels, Speer, and Stuckart from the Reich Ministry of the Interior, see TBJG, II/13, 491 (16 September 1944), 501 (17 September 1944). The failure of relations between the Party and the Wehrmacht in the first critical days of the Allied advance on Aachen prompted Hitler’s directives of 19 and 20 September, ordering the continuation of the activities of Party and civil administration in operational areas, also within the Reich itself, and stipulating the duties of the Gauleiter/Reich Defence Commissars. (Weisungen, 337–41; Warlimont, 478–9.)
266. TBJG, ??/13, 553 (24 September 1944).
267. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 306.
268. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 260; TBJG, II/14, 89 (23 October 1944).
269. Below, 391.
270. Bormann Letters, 139 (25 October 1944).
271. Bormann Letters, 138 (24 October 1944); Schroeder, 150.
272. TBJG, II/14, 93 (24 October 1944). See also TBJG, II/14, 88 (23 October 1944), Schroeder, 150; and Irving, HW, 725.
273. Below, 391; TBJG, II/14, 110 (26 October 1944); Irving, HW, 726, 893 note. Hitler was keen to make use of the atrocities for propaganda purposes. (See Jodl’s note arising from the military briefing on 25 October 1944 in IfZ, Nbg.-Dok., 1787-PS, 496: ‘Russian atrocities in the occupation of East Prussian territory must be spread by Wehrmacht propaganda. Photographs, questioning of witnesses, factual reports etc. for this. Where are the [Wehrmacht] propaganda companies?’ (‘Russische Greueltaten bei der Besetzung ostpreu?ischen Gebiets mussen durch Wpr verbreitet werden. Dazu Aufnahmen. Zeugenvernehmung, Tatsachenberichte usw. Wo bleiben die Prop.- Kompanien?’)) Whatever the propaganda exploitation, there can be no doubt that horrific atrocities were indeed perpetrated by soldiers of the Red Army. In military terms, the short-lived capture of Gumbinnen and Goldap (at high cost) provided Soviet forces with valuable experience to prepare their later full-scale assault on East Prussia. (Glantz and House, 228–9, 365–6 (n.34).)
274. KTB OKW, iv/1, 439, 442–3; Warlimont, 480; Below, 391–2.
275. Below, 390.
276. See TBJG, II/13, 582 (28 September 1944); Irving, HW, 708; Samuel W. Mitcham Jr, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim’, in Ueberschar, Hitlers militarische Elite, II, 72–7.
277. TBJG, II/14, 328 (2 December 1944).
278. In discussion with Goebbels, one of the Reich Marshal’s main detractors, Hitler defended Goring and pointed to his earlier services in building up the Luftwaffe (TBJG, II/13, 213 (3 August 1944)). Sentimentality is, however, unlikely to have been the real reason for holding on to Goring. Issues of public image were more weighty.
279. Below, 394; Irving, HW, 708, 714, 728; Mitcham, 76.
280. TBJG II/13, 582 (28 September 1944); Irving, HW 728. See also Irving, Goring, 438–45.
281. TBJG, II/14, 330 (2 December 1944).
282. Speer, 578. n.21; Irving, Goring, 442, 444. Hitler cut Below short when the latter advocated the exclusive use of the Me262s as fighters (Below, 393). Despite his insistence on their production as bombers, the first fifty fighters began operations in mid-October (Irving, Goring, 442).
283. See his comments in his military briefing on 28 December 1944 (LB Darmstadt, 314); also his hints in this direction in the briefing on 12 December (LB Darmstadt, 294). He told Goebbels at the beginning of December that German arms were superior to those of the Allies in all areas except that of the Luftwaffe, and that there was no prospect of overcoming this inferiority in the near future (TBJG, II/14, 330 (2 December 1944)).
284. TBJG, II/13, 503–4 (17 September 1944), 510 (18 September 1944).
285. TBJG, II/14, 193 (10 November 1944), 210 (13 November 1944).
286. Domarus, 2162. The words ‘Ausrottung’ (‘eradication’) and ‘Vernichtung’ (‘annihilation’) were used on numerous occasions during the proclamation.
287. Domarus, 2163.
288. Domarus, 2165–6.
289. Domarus, 2165.
290. Domarus, 2167.
291. Below, 395. For further indications of despondency, see Irving, HW, 893, note to 726, and 894, note to 739.
292. TBJG, II/14, 210 (13 November 1944), 217 (16 November 1944). For Hitler’s general ill-health, throat problems, nervous tension about the coming offensive, and irritability in November 1944, see Schenk, 256–62; Irving, Doctor, 187–97 (from Morell’s diary).
293. Below, 395; Schenck, 320–23; Irving, Doctor, 194–7; Irving, HW, 734. The operation was carried out on 22 November. For a week, he could speak only in a whisper (Below, 396).
294. TBJG II/14, 316 (2 December 1944).
