59. Kurchatov to Pervukhin, Apr. 7, 1945, reprinted in Sudoplatov et al. (1994), 460–61.
60. Kurchatov to Pervukhin, Mar. 7, 1945, reprinted in Sudoplatov et al. (1994), 446.
61. San Francisco to Moscow, Jan. 10, 1945, Venona decrypts; Benson, Venona Historical Monograph, no. 3, 3.
62. San Francisco to Moscow, Apr. 3, 1945, Venona decrypts.
63. San Francisco to Moscow, Apr. 6, 1945, Venona decrypts; Alexander Feklisov, The Man Behind the Rosenbergs (Enigma Books, 2001), 53.
64. Earlier, Apresyan informed Moscow that he had “already established official contact with [Map’s] institution,” presumably the American-Russian Institute in San Francisco. San Francisco to Moscow, Apr. 3, 1945, Venona decrypts.
65. San Francisco to Moscow, May 4, 1945, Venona decrypts. White and the UN: Romerstein and Breindel (2000), 48–49; Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 168 fn.
66. The previous summer, when Kheifets was about to return to Moscow, Chevalier had given him a letter of introduction to the daughter of the Mexican ambassador in Moscow. Chevalier to Jane Quintanilla, June 29, 1944, “Correspondence, 1944–45,” Chevalier papers.
67. While Bransten defended Moscow resolutely, Chevalier was more critical of communist dogma. San Francisco field report, Jan. 26, 1945, sec. 3, Chevalier file, FBI.
68. It was evidently at this reception that Ernest joined the American-Russian Institute, a step that would later get him into trouble with the FBI, which obtained ARI membership rolls in a black-bag operation. Unidentified agent to Whitson, Oct. 6, 1949, and San Francisco field report, Feb. 20, 1951, Ernest Lawrence file, no. 116–10798, FBI.
69. “Report of Meeting with the President,” Apr. 25, 1945, file 24, series 1, part 1, MED/NARA.
70. “Summary Russian Situation,” n.d., “Recently Declassified Extracts,” MED/NARA. Groves estimated it would take the Russians twenty years or more to produce a bomb. Transcript of telephone conversation, May 21, 1945, file 12, series 1, pt. 1, MED/NARA.
71. Entry, May 28, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA. The Soviets hoped to use the occasion to forge personal links with several U.S. atomic scientists. Moscow to New York, Apr. 3, 1945, Venona decrypts; Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 209–10.
72. Interim Committee: Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (Vintage, 1987), 169–70.
73. Scientific Panel: “Notes of an Informal Meeting,” May 9, 1945, file 100, MED/NARA; Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 344–45; Sherwin (1987), 169; May 10, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA.
74. “Memorandum for the Secretary,” May 30, 1945, and “Memorandum for Mr. Schott,” May 30, 1945, file 100, MED/NARA.
75. “Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting,” May 31, 1945, file 100, MED/NARA; James Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (Harper, 1958), 283.
76. “He felt that research had to go on unceasingly.… He thought it might be possible one day to secure our energy from terrestrial sources rather than from the sun.”
77. Oppenheimer suggested that “we might open up this subject with them in a tentative fashion and in the most general terms without giving them any details of our productive effort.”
78. The quotation is from Lawrence’s subsequent account of the meeting in a letter to a friend, Karl Darrow, a historian of science. Darrow to Lawrence, Aug. 9, 1945, and Lawrence to Darrow, Aug. 17, 1945, folder 20, carton 28, EOL; Compton (1956), 238.
79. Bush and Conant, for example, had raised the possibility of a demonstration—of the bomb or possibly radiological poisons—in a Sept. 30, 1944, memo to Stimson. Sherwin (1975), 286–88. The demonstration was also discussed on at least two occasions at Los Alamos, in meetings of Mar. 1943 and late 1944 that Robert Wilson helped to organize. Oppenheimer spoke against the demonstration at the 1944 meeting, Wilson later recalled. Author interview with Robert Wilson, Los Alamos, N. Mex., Apr. 15, 1983.
80. No notes were taken of this lunchtime discussion, and two conflicting versions exist. Herbert Childs interview with Arthur Compton, n.d., Childs papers.
81. The phrase is from Lawrence’s letter to Darrow, Aug. 17, 1945, folder 20, carton 28, EOL.
82. Sherwin (1987), 302.
83. Oppenheimer to Groves, May 7, 1945, “Bomb Design and Testing” folder, Army/NARA.
84. Franck report: Sherwin (1987), 210–15; Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America, 1945–47 (MIT Press, 1971), 371–83.
85. The demonstration had been resurrected as well by Glenn Seaborg, one of the contributors to the Franck report, in a letter that Lawrence received just before leaving for Los Alamos. Seaborg to Lawrence, June 13, 1945, folder 22, carton 30, EOL.
86. Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 170–71. Teller claimed that Fermi asked his opinion on how the bomb should be used about this time, and that his answer was “noncommittal”—not realizing that Fermi was on a panel advising on the weapon’s use. “Had I known, I would have said that it should be tested and then shown, but not used.” Edward Teller, Feb. 26, 1999, personal communication.
87. Although Compton had commissioned the Franck report, he did not agree with its conclusion about the demonstration. Compton’s arguments against the demonstration were in a dissent that he disguised as a cover memo to Stimson’s copy of the Franck report. Compton (1956), 238–41; Sherwin (1987), 213.
88. Childs (1968), 363.
89. Robert Serber claimed that Oppenheimer took the demonstration option seriously enough to explore it with high-ranking representatives of the army’s air force; but the latter were, Serber later remembered, “adamantly opposed.” Author interview with Robert Serber, New York, N.Y., Oct. 26, 1984.
90. “There was not sufficient agreement among the members of the panel to unite upon a statement as to how or under what conditions such use [of the bomb] was to be made,” Compton later wrote. Compton (1956), 240; Wyden (1984), 171; Oppenheimer to Secretary of War, June 16, 1945, no. 76, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
91. Oppenheimer to Secretary of War, June 16, 1945, no. 76, Harrison-Bundy file MED/NARA. The recommendation on the immediate use of
