Dialogues

let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives. Cleinias Very true; and we entirely agree with you. Athenian And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not. Cleinias You are quite right. Athenian Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you. Cleinias Proceed. Athenian Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one? Cleinias We do. Athenian And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain. Cleinias Exactly. Athenian Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law. Cleinias I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were. Megillus I am in the like case. Athenian Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose⁠—which of the two we cannot certainly know? But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression “superior or inferior to a man’s self” will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary. Cleinias Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse. Athenian Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object. Cleinias Proceed. Athenian Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink⁠—what will be the effect on him? Cleinias Having what in view do you ask that question? Athenian Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow. I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am now asking is this⁠—Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves? Cleinias Very greatly. Athenian And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink? Cleinias Yes, they entirely desert him. Athenian Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child? Cleinias He does. Athenian Then at that time he will have the least control over himself? Cleinias The least. Athenian And will he not be in a most wretched plight? Cleinias Most wretched. Athenian Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child? Cleinias Well said, Stranger. Athenian Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it? Cleinias I suppose that there is; you at any rate, were just now saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine. Athenian True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both declared that you are anxious to hear me. Cleinias To be sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation. Athenian Are you speaking of the soul? Cleinias Yes. Athenian And what would you say about the body, my friend? Are you not surprised at anyone of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude? Cleinias Certainly. Athenian Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor’s shop, and takes medicine, is he not aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a