Erasistratus: He certainly would not appear so to me.
Socrates: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious stone, we should say that he was very rich?
Erasistratus: Of course.
Socrates: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?
Erasistratus: Yes.
Socrates: And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no value because they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so much store on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because he could use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage is not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver, to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us.
Erasistratus: True.
Socrates: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us is not wealth?
But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting. Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence (?) and various other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth.
Socrates: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all—thus much is acknowledged by everyone. But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things? Let us pursue the argument in another way; and then we may perhaps find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and for what purpose has the possession of riches been invented—in the sense, I mean, in which drugs have been discovered for the cure of disease? Perhaps in this way we may throw some light on the question. It appears to be clear that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that wealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to enquire, What is the use of those useful things which constitute wealth? For all things probably may be said to be useful which we use in production, just as all things which have life are animals, but there is a special kind of animal which we call “man.” Now if anyone were to ask us, What is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and the instruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case if disease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at all or went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude that medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have none, suppose that we restate the question thus:—If a man could live without food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would he want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs?
Eryxias: He would not.
Socrates: And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for the service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and heat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us, there would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in order that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect of our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown to us, we should not need wealth, and possibly there would be no such thing as wealth.
Eryxias: Clearly not.
Socrates: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is useful to this end?
Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably troubled him.
Socrates: And what is your opinion about another question:—Would you say that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless for the production of the same result?
Eryxias: I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to produce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not.
Socrates: Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue, we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it would be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases.
Eryxias: Clearly.
Socrates: And therefore conditions which are not required for the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?
Eryxias: Of course not.
Socrates: And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do not use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink and bedding and houses—if without these we could satisfy the wants of the body, they would be of no use to us for that purpose?
Eryxias: They would not.
Socrates: They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they are useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain what was useful to us?
Eryxias: O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that gold and silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly of opinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that the money which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not that these things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure wealth.
Socrates: And how would you answer another question? There are persons, are there not,
